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Could “fake news” have First Amendment value? This claim would
seem to be almost frivolous given the potential for fake news to
undermine two core functions of the freedom of speech—promoting
democracy and facilitating the search for “truth,” as well as the
corollary that to be valuable, speech must promote rational delibera-
tion. Some would therefore claim that fake news should be classified
as “no value” speech falling outside of the First Amendment’s reach.
This Article argues somewhat counterintuitively that fake news has
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value because speech doctrine should not be focused exclusively on
the promotion of rational deliberation, but should also limit the
state’s ability to control the way we emotionally experience ideas,
beliefs, and even facts. It claims that like art, music, religious
expression, and other forms of human communication that do not
facilitate rational deliberation in their audiences, fake news can
promote a form of expressive experiential autonomy. It can allow
individuals to experience individual self-realization and identity
formation and also form cultural connections with like-minded
people, advancing social cohesion. Drawing on First Amendment
theory and on the fields of cognitive and social psychology and
political science, this Article views consumers of fake news not simply
as uninformed, gullible rubes, but as individuals seeking simulta-
neously to distinguish themselves through individualization or self-
identification and to connect themselves through group association
with a community of people with whom they share values. Under-
stood in this way, this inquiry illustrates why the rational delibera-
tion principle is incomplete because it does not explain much of what
we ought to recognize as “speech.” This more nuanced understanding
of the way that fake news connects with much of its audience has
implications for free speech theory, First Amendment doctrine, and
policy-making options for addressing the potential harms of fake
news. To be clear, this Article is not a defense of fake news or those
who intentionally attempt to influence others’ behavior by spreading
false facts disguised as legitimate news. Thus, this Article concludes
by explaining that while fake news should always be covered by the
First Amendment, it should not always be protected.
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INTRODUCTION
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan famously once said, “Everyone
is entitled to his own opinion but not to his own facts.”1 This Article
examines the extent to which the second half of this iconic bit of
wisdom is valid. That is, it explores whether there are ways in
which even so-called fake news may have some First Amendment
value, particularly to its listeners, in ways that have previously
gone unrecognized. If such mistruths do have some value, this has
important theoretical, doctrinal, and policy implications. At the
theoretical level, such a claim tests the boundaries of self-realization
justifications for classifying types of communication as “speech” and
invites comparisons to other forms of expression that might be
valued not because they appeal to rational, cognitive processes but
to emotional functions and experiences. From the doctrinal perspec-
tive, recognition of the possible value of fake news substantially
complicates the already difficult constitutional challenges facing the
potential regulation of such communication to safeguard our de-
mocracy from epistemic harm. And from a policy standpoint, un-
derstanding the ways that fake news provides value to some of its
consumers could help explain why it is so pervasive and why direct
censorship might be counterproductive—crucial perspectives for
policymakers trying to study and devise solutions to counteract its
negative effects.
The phenomenon of fake news stories in the United States is
hardly new, extending back at least as far as the period of the
American Revolution.2 The possible influence of fake news continues
to be salient in the wake of the 2016 U.S. presidential election and
the foreground of the 2020 election, not to mention President
Trump’s now commonplace invocation of the phrase to assail his
critics in the mainstream media.3 Fake news seems to pervade every
conceivable topic of public interest, from electoral politics to the
1. Steven R. Wiseman, Introduction to DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, DANIEL PATRICK
MOYNIHAN: A PORTRAIT IN LETTERS OF AN AMERICAN VISIONARY 1, 2 (Steven R. Wiseman ed.,
2010).
2. See infra notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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COVID-19 pandemic to voter fraud to climate change. Whether the
problems associated with fake news are substantially worse now
than they have been in the past, because of the emergence of social
networking platforms and the inability or unwillingness of internet
intermediaries to take control of or responsibility for content,4 is
debatable.5 This Article remains agnostic on that point, which is not
central to its analysis.
Despite widespread public outcry over the perceived problems of
fake news, and, to a lesser extent, politicians’ lies, and the instinc-
tive desire to do “something” about the problem, meaningful
regulatory proposals have been, thus far, rare.6 One reason for this
may be that the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause likely
represents a significant barrier to such efforts. State regulation of
fake news dissemination would be inherently content-based, and
therefore suspect under current doctrine, particularly since the
Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that lies are categori-
cally exempt from First Amendment protection.7 Although such
constitutional protection disappears when the lies cause a legally
cognizable harm, there remain numerous constitutional barriers to
valid regulations, including concerns about vagueness, overbreadth,
the government acting as the gatekeeper of truth, and the potential
for weaponization of such laws to interfere with truthful speech.8
The focus of this Article, however, is not on such traditional First
Amendment claims.
4. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1660 (2018) (observing that platforms have not yet
played a significant role in determining the truth or falsity of content).
5. Recent studies have shown that the influence of fake news on the 2016 presidential
election and other aspects of American politics has been vastly overestimated. See, e.g.,
Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, Selective Exposure to Misinformation:
Evidence from the Consumption of Fake News During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Selective-exposure-to-misinformation%
3A-Evidence-from-Guess-Nyhan/a795b451b3d38ca1d22a6075dbb0be4fc94b4000?p2df [https://
perma.cc/M36J-EW63].
6. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
7. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721-22 (2012) (plurality opinion).
8. See id. at 719; see also id. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[M]any statutes and
common-law doctrines make the utterance of certain kinds of false statements unlawful.
Those prohibitions, however ... limit the scope of their application, sometimes by requiring
proof of specific harm to identifiable victims.”).
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To the general public, and even many academics, the proposition
that laws restricting fake news violate the Free Speech Clause must
seem absurd. If the constitutional guarantee of free speech means
anything, surely it should embrace protection of the integrity of
public discourse such that government restraints on verifiably false
statements of fact should fall well outside the boundaries of what
counts as speech. Thus, another claim supporting the legitimate
regulation of fake news would be that, like obscenity,9 private
defamation,10 and fighting words,11 fake news is a category of ex-
pression that not only has little or no social value but also causes
tangible, epistemic harm to society by denigrating or distorting
public discourse and undermining democracy.12 This argument, in
turn, relates to a central claim that underlies much First Amend-
ment theory—that speech’s value is primarily connected to its abil-
ity to facilitate rational deliberation in its audience, thus advancing
the goals of promoting democracy and truth finding. To the extent
that fake news undermines rational deliberation, it is seemingly
antithetical to those foundational speech objectives and its regu-
lation therefore ought not to be a concern of the First Amendment.
This Article addresses such claims by undertaking a broader
inquiry. It uses fake news as a vehicle for exploring the limits of
rational deliberation as an organizing principle for free speech law.
While it is certainly not the first scholarly work to critically examine
the role of rational deliberation under First Amendment law, what
it shows is that even the democracy- and truth-promoting rationales
for covering speech do not always and should not always rely solely
on individuals’ capacity for rational deliberation. At the same time,
this does not at all eliminate democracy or truth seeking as justi-
fications for covering and protecting speech. Rather, this exploration
of rational deliberation reveals the incomplete way that First
9. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973).
10. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1985)
(plurality opinion); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974).
11. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
12. Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, Developing a Taxonomy of Lies Under the First
Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 664, 677 (2018) (explaining that no-value speech is
defined both with relation to the speech’s lack of value and its undisputed harmful effects).
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Amendment law conceptualizes how individuals receive and ex-
perience different forms of expression.13
As a way of testing these ideas, this Article examines how they
might be used to think about First Amendment law’s application to
regulatory responses to the perceived proliferation of fake news
through social media platforms. This Article argues somewhat coun-
terintuitively that fake news has social value because while it might
not promote rational deliberation—indeed, it might undermine
rational deliberation—free speech law should not be exclusively
focused on the goal of promoting such deliberation. Free speech law
should also protect people from government control of the way they
emotionally or viscerally experience ideas and beliefs, and maybe
even the facts that underlie those thoughts. Furthermore, in many
instances, fake news also promotes social cohesion by building a
cultural connection among individuals with certain belief systems.
Governmental efforts to directly regulate or prohibit fake news thus
may paradoxically promote some goals of free speech, while con-
travening others.
Thus, this Article disputes the premise that fake news has no
intrinsic value. Rather, this category of speech might be understood
to facilitate a type of listener self-realization that I call expressive
experiential autonomy. Understood in this way, fake news might
even be conceptualized in the same way the law understands
religious self-realization, which is similarly premised on faith rather
than historical fact. In addition, this approach compares consumers
of fake news to listeners who value certain forms of nonverbal
communication, such as abstract art and instrumental music, not
because it promotes rational deliberation but because, like artistic
expression, it “serves a community building function ... [and] simul-
taneously advances an autonomy-promoting function in its facil-
itation of individualized emotional expression and experience.”14
Finally, those who value fake news in this way might be communi-
cating their connection not only by how it affects them but also in
13. For earlier work in which I similarly argue against a single, overarching theory jus-
tifying the freedom of expression, see MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER,
FREE SPEECH BEYOND WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (2017).
14. Alan K. Chen, Instrumental Music and the First Amendment, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 381,
438 (2015). See generally TUSHNET ET AL., supra note 13.
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signaling to others that they are part of the same community.15
Clicking “like” on or retweeting a fake news story on social media is
its own powerful form of communication.16 On this view, fake news
can be seen as a vehicle for the development of social cohesion
among marginalized groups in our political structure that is based
not on objective truths but on a worldview reliant more on faith and
self-identification than on tangible reality.
Moreover, seeing fake news through this lens complicates the
efforts of reformers even more than traditional First Amendment
doctrine. This perspective views consumers of fake news not simply
as uninformed, gullible rubes, but as individuals seeking simulta-
neously to distinguish themselves through individualization or self-
identification and to form a group association with a community of
people with whom they share values. But this understanding of fake
news does not just expand our thinking about free speech; it may
also help us to understand why fake news can be so effective. That,
in turn, might help policymakers to understand the phenomenon
and aid us in thinking about ways to address the conceded social
harms caused by the proliferation of fake news.
To be clear, this is not a defense of fake news or those who in-
tentionally attempt to influence others’ behavior by spreading false
facts disguised as legitimate news. This Article concedes that fake
news may work serious social harms, though perhaps takes a more
muted view about the degree of this phenomenon.17 It also accepts
that fake news might undermine rational deliberation in ways that
are problematic. In other words, even if this Article persuasively
argues that fake news is sufficiently valuable to be covered by the
15. Social media influences how we want to appear to our friends and the outside world.
See, e.g., Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Opinion, Don’t Let Facebook Make You Miserable, N.Y.
TIMES (May 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/06/opinion/sunday/dont-let-facebook-
make-you-miserable.html [https://perma.cc/F9PC-FWLH].
16. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013) (“On the most basic level, clicking
on the ‘like’ button literally causes to be published the statement that the [u]ser ‘likes’
something, which is itself a substantive statement. In the context of a political campaign’s
Facebook page, the meaning that the user approves of the candidacy whose page is being liked
is unmistakable. That a user may use a single mouse click to produce that message that he
likes the page instead of typing the same message with several individual key strokes is of no
constitutional significance.”); Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 2019 WL 3856591,
at *4-5 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2019) (finding plaintiff ’s retweet was protected speech), appeal
docketed, No. 19-2994 (8th Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
17. See supra note 5.
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First Amendment, there may be situations in which it is nonethe-
less not constitutionally protected.18
The exploration of this topic is developed in four parts. Part I
begins by providing some definitional criteria for what counts as
fake news, then surveys the history of fake news and attempts to
address the problems such news creates. It then recounts a few of
the fake news stories that were generated during and after the 2016
election cycle and articulates some of the legitimate second- and
third-party harms that can result from widespread dissemination
of fake news. It goes on to examine potential regulatory responses
to fake news and the traditional First Amendment doctrinal bar-
riers to the implementation of state-sponsored reforms. Part II
provides an overview of the role of rational deliberation in free
speech theory and how it relates to classifying what types of ex-
pression count as speech for First Amendment purposes. Because
fake news might be said to undermine rational deliberation, this
could be a persuasive premise for placing such expression outside
the First Amendment’s coverage. Part III then develops the claim
that fake news, at least in some contexts and for some people, has
First Amendment value that should not be completely discounted in
evaluating the constitutionality and wisdom of proposed regu-
lations. It suggests that fake news may actually promote listener
autonomy in important and previously unrecognized ways by ad-
vancing salutary and social cohesion interests that enhance
individual self-realization. This Part also explores why fake news
can be such an effective form of communication, drawing in part on
political science and cognitive and social psychology literature to
illustrate its self-affirming effects. Finally, Part IV addresses
important limitations on this Article’s thesis and possible ways of
responding to the problematic aspects of fake news while not un-
dermining its potential value. Consistent with much First Amend-
ment doctrine, these ideas include the promotion of more speech (or
“counterspeech”), as well as legal and technological mechanisms
that could mitigate the harms of fake news by promoting individual
choice.
18. As Leslie Kendrick recently described it, “I am asking whether [speakers] have a claim
against governmental interference—a claim that may or may not prevail.” Leslie Kendrick,
Are Speech Rights for Speakers?, 103 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1776 (2017).
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I. THE “FAKE NEWS” PHENOMENON
The spread of fake news in the United States is hardly a new
phenomenon. In fact, as explored below, this country has a long and
storied history of fake news distributed to the public for specific
goals. This Part begins by defining what constitutes fake news for
purposes of this discussion. Next, it provides a brief overview of the
history of fake news in the United States and the emergence of
contemporary versions of fake news. It also touches on arguments
about whether fake news is substantially more problematic in the
age of the internet and social media. Finally, it examines some pre-
liminary proposals to regulate fake news and why they would like-
ly be unable to withstand traditional First Amendment scrutiny.
A. Defining Fake News
Perhaps no other aspect of the 2016 national election has been
the focus of more reporting, editorializing, and debating than the
role of lies in the context of the presidential campaign and beyond.
Accusations of lying were directed at political candidates, main-
stream news media, interest groups, and other individuals and
organizations posting stories meant to be understood as legitimate
news on various social media platforms.19 There has been such a
dizzying variety of reported lies that it is hard to keep track of them,
much less think about how to address them.
Thus, with the degree to which lies, fake news, and other
falsehoods seem to permeate contemporary public discourse, it is
critical at the outset to address the scope of what this Article calls
“fake news.” Indeed, as discussed below, the definitional problem is
one of the challenges that plagues potential regulatory initiatives.20
Others have already observed the difficulty of delineating precisely
what we mean when we talk about “fake news,” and indeed the
meaning is highly contested.21
19. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News,” 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
232, 245 (2017) (“The term ‘fake news’ has no single definition because it refers to a wide
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This Article defines fake news as the deliberate, public commu-
nication as truthful of a verifiably false and material statement of
fact regarding a matter of public concern, in which the original
source is an entity representing itself to be a legitimate journalistic
enterprise or otherwise reliable source of news stories.22 Because the
focus of this Article is on listeners or consumers of fake news, the
speaker’s specific objective is immaterial—it could be to influence
an election or policy debate, to make a profit from generating click-
based advertising revenue, or even to be provocative, mischievous,
or entertaining. Furthermore, for that same reason, the discussion
does not distinguish between the original source and the republica-
tion or recirculation of information from that source.
At the same time, the discussion brackets political lies told by
candidates, their surrogates, or interest groups in the context of an
electoral or ballot-initiative campaign.23 It also sets aside for now
the emerging problem of “deepfake” videos that involve visual and
sometimes verbal depictions that represent an incident that has not
actually occurred or words that have not been spoken by the alleged
variety of things.”); Claire Wardle, Fake News. It’s Complicated, FIRST DRAFT (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://firstdraftnews.org/latest/fake-news-complicated/ [https://perma.cc/QWQ2-XNNL]
(attempting to create a taxonomy of different types of speech that might be labeled as fake
news).
22. This definition is not far off from what others have used. See, e.g., High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affs. & Sec. Pol’y, Action Plan Against Disinformation, at 1, JOIN
(2018) 36 final (Dec. 5, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/eu-
communication-disinformation-euco-05122018_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/776H-52D2] (“Dis-
information is understood as verifiably false or misleading information that is created,
presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may
cause public harm.”); Clay Calvert & Austin Vining, Filtering Fake News Through a Lens of
Supreme Court Observations and Adages, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 153, 158-59 (2017)
(defining fake news “as encompassing only articles that suggest, by both their appearance and
content, the conveyance of real news, but also knowingly include at least one material factual
assertion that is empirically verifiable as false and that is not otherwise protected by the fair
report privilege” (footnotes omitted)).
23. Even before the 2016 election, there had been increasing concerns about lies told by
political candidates and interest groups at the state level, leading some jurisdictions to enact
laws prohibiting lying in the context of campaigns for public office and ballot initiatives. See,
e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 469-71 (6th Cir. 2016). The courts have
typically invalidated these laws on First Amendment grounds. See id. at 472-76; 281 Care
Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2014). For an excellent discussion of the range
of categories of political lies, see Catherine J. Ross, Ministry of Truth: Why Law Can’t Stop
Prevarications, Bullshit, and Straight-Out Lies in Political Campaigns, 16 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 367 (2017).
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speaker.24 Although there is obviously some overlap between fake
news and these first two categories of mistruths, they also raise
conceptually distinct issues. This Article’s definition of fake news
also excludes news parodies ranging from The Onion to The Daily
Show, which use comedic devices surrounding real news stories to
promote social commentary.25 Parodies are not only generally un-
derstood as such, but also are independently protected under the
First Amendment.26 Finally, this definition of fake news does not
include the often politically motivated assertions by the President
and other elected officials who have branded the mainstream media
with the fake news epithet, apparently to undermine the media’s
credibility and blunt its criticism.27
B. A Brief Chronology of Fake News
While some might believe fake news to be a product of modern
times and social media, a quick survey shows that, as numerous
others have recounted, fake news is hardly an invention of recent
vintage.28 Fabricated, sensationalistic, and exaggerated stories
have been pervasive throughout Western societies for centuries.
Robert Darnton traces a version of fake news back to the historian
24. See Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2019). Facebook recently
announced that it will ban videos that are altered by artificial intelligence to create deepfakes,
though the ban will not extend to personally edited videos, parodies, or satire. David McCabe
& Davey Alba, Facebook Says It Will Ban “Deepfakes,” N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/01/07/technology/facebook-says-it-will-ban-deepfakes.html [https://perma.
cc/HUC4-T9GN].
25. See, e.g., Alexandra Petri, Opinion, The Hottest Gift This Holiday Season: Your Own
Set of Facts!, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2019, 10:42 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2019/11/27/hottest-gift-this-holiday-season-your-own-set-facts/ [https://perma.cc/
H9FL-HVP9].
26. See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988).
27. Levi, supra note 21, at 233 n.2 (distinguishing what she calls “real” fake news
[“intentionally fabricated misinformation”] from “fake” fake news, which she describes as use
of the fake news label to discredit the mainstream press).
28. See Robert Darnton, The True History of Fake News, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 13,
2017, 1:22 PM), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/02/13/the-true-history-of-fake-news/
[https://perma.cc/D3UE-6K76]; Jacob Soll, The Long and Brutal History of Fake News,
POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-
long-violent-214535 [https://perma.cc/6AJT-BTPQ]; David Uberti, The Real History of Fake
News, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/fake_
news_history.php [https://perma.cc/788Y-YMFJ].
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Procopius, who in the sixth century AD reportedly wrote false
stories to damage the reputation of the Roman Emperor Justinian
I.29 Darton also recounts the efforts to influence a pontifical election
in 1522 by a critic who wrote “wicked sonnets about all the candi-
dates (except the favorite of his Medici patrons)” and posted them
on the bust of a figure known as Pasquino in a public plaza in
Rome.30 This practice was copied by others and developed into
something known as “pasquinade,” a “common genre of diffusing
nasty news, most of it fake, about public figures.”31
Pasquinades, in turn, were followed in the seventeenth century
“by a more popular genre, the ‘canard,’ a version of fake news that
was hawked in the streets of Paris for the next two hundred
years.”32 One of the highest-selling canards during the late 1700s
reported that a monster with “the head of a Fury, wings like a bat,
a gigantic body covered in scales, and a dragon-like tail” had been
captured in Chile and was being brought to Spain.33 Canards, which
were frequently printed with engravings to enhance their legiti-
macy, were used to spread “intentionally fake political propaganda”
about Marie Antoinette during the French Revolution.34 As Darnton
suggests, “Although its impact cannot be measured, it certainly
contributed to the pathological hatred of the queen, which led to her
execution.”35 In eighteenth-century London, publications such as
The Morning Post and The Morning Herald thrived by circulating
collections of paragraph-length false news items.36
Moving across the Atlantic, given the hallowed place of journal-
ism in American media lore, many observers may be surprised that
the professionalized, independent journalism industry is a relatively
recent creation, emerging only after the onset of the twentieth
century.37 Indeed, in the United States, the Society of Professional








37. JONATHAN M. LADD, WHY AMERICANS HATE THE MEDIA AND HOW IT MATTERS 6 (2012)
(“The existence of an independent, powerful, widely respected news media establishment is
an historical anomaly. Prior to the twentieth century, such an institution had never existed
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Journalists was not founded until 1909, when it established a set
of standards for professional journalism.38 Some scholars attribute
the move of professional journalists away from partisanship to
the increasing availability of commercial advertising as a revenue
source.39
Prior to that, it was common for newspapers to be unabashedly
partisan and to publish stories that their authors and readers were
well aware were shaped by partisan leanings.40 From the Founding
Era until the twentieth century, fake news stories were prevalent
in the United States.41 One early incident involved the circulation
of false stories about George Washington.
Someone published pamphlets that included letters supposedly
written by Washington to his family and describing that he was
miserable during the revolutionary war and lamenting that the
revolutionary war was a mistake. The fake news was very
convincing, purportedly an excellent forgery of his writing style.
Even George Washington admitted he was impressed with how
well the letters mimicked his writing. Unfortunately, the letters
were influential in persuading some members of the public that
Washington was a British loyalist. The letters haunted him
throughout his presidency and tarnished his reputation.42
in American history.”).
38. See Carol A. Watson, Information Literacy in a Fake/False News World: An Overview
of the Characteristics of Fake News and Its Historical Development, 46 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO.
93, 95 (2018); Jennifer Peebles, History of the Society, SOC’Y PROF’L JOURNALISTS, https://
www.spj.org/spjhistory.asp [https://perma.cc/E5J8-V5X8]; see also LADD, supra note 37, at 6
(“The existence of an independent, powerful, widely respected news media establishment is
an historical anomaly. Prior to the twentieth century, such an institution had never existed
in American history.”).
39. Michael Schudson, The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism, 2 JOURNALISM 149,
150 (2001) (“Some authors would say that objectivity emerged at the point where newspaper
proprietors saw opportunities for commercial success and were therefore willing to bid
farewell to political party underwriters.”).
40. Richard Kaplan, The Origins of Objectivity in American Journalism, in THE ROUT-
LEDGE COMPANION TO NEWS AND JOURNALISM 25, 30 (Stuart Allan ed., 2010) (“Throughout
the nineteenth century, American journalism was publicly and forthrightly partisan.”). There
are, however, contested views on exactly when domestic journalism became professionalized
and objectivity the norm. Id. at 25.
41. Zahr K. Said & Jessica Silbey, Narrative Topoi in the Digital Age, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC.
103, 110 (2018) (“Hoaxes, misinformation, rumors, gossip, and outright lies—passed off as
facts, often for profit or political motive—are older than the diverse mass communication used
to disseminate untruths in the modern era.”).
42. Watson, supra note 38, at 95.
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Another of our nation’s founders was a perpetrator of fake news.
It has been reported that Benjamin Franklin published a fake
newspaper in 1782 “that included frightening recounts of Indians
mercilessly scalping the family members of colonists at the behest
of King George III.”43 His intention in circulating the paper was
allegedly to “stoke sentiment for the revolutionary war and provoke
ire against Native Americans.”44 Newspapers during the Founding
Era were so unreliable that Thomas Jefferson was prompted to
write in 1807: “Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a
newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put into that
polluted vehicle.”45 This cynical statement reflects that his opinions
about the importance of a free press had changed dramatically.46
Numerous fake news stories were circulated in the nineteenth
century as well. In the 1830s, the New York Sun published a multi-
part story falsely reporting that life had been discovered on the
moon.47 In another sensationalist example, the New York Herald
published a lengthy article in 1874 about an escape of animals from
the Central Park Zoo that resulted in dozens of deaths.48 Despite the
fact that the paper included an express statement that the story was
not true, it sparked panic among New York residents who attempt-
ed to flee the city.49 And although we might not generally place this
incident in the category of fake news, Orson Welles’s radio broadcast
of The War of the Worlds was reportedly believed by a wide range of
listeners, though that story in itself might be fake news.50
Nor, despite popular sentiment, are conspiracy theories either
new or on the rise. Political scientists Joseph E. Uscinski and
Joseph M. Parent studied the prevalence of conspiracy theories in
the United States by examining over one hundred years’ worth of
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Uberti, supra note 28.
46. Compare Jefferson’s statement in a 1787 letter to Edward Carrington: “Were it left
to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.” THE YALE BOOK
OF QUOTATIONS 393 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
47. Uberti, supra note 28.
48. Id.; Watson, supra note 38, at 95.
49. Uberti, supra note 28.
50. Watson, supra note 38, at 95.
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letters to the editors of newspapers.51 As one summary of their work
reports,
[A]veraging out the short-term ups and downs, they conclude
that the amount of “conspiracy talk” has remained constant
since the nineteen-sixties and has actually declined since the
eighteen-nineties: “We do not live in an age of conspiracy
theories and have not for some time.” That we believe we do
makes sense, since that sentiment, too, is a constant.52
Returning to the 2016 presidential race, lies seemed to pervade
the atmosphere of public discourse. During the campaign, Donald
Trump made assertions that were not substantiated by any ev-
idence, while simultaneously branding Hillary Clinton and others
who impugned his reputation as liars.53 Long before the 2016
campaign even began, Trump was one of the most vocal proponents
of the falsehood that President Obama was not born in the United
States, even after Obama produced a certified copy of his birth
certificate.54 Since the inauguration, President Trump and his aides
have also made verifiably false statements of fact on relatively
trivial matters, such as how many people attended his inau-
guration.55
51. Elizabeth Kolbert, What’s New About Conspiracy Theories?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 15,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/04/22/whats-new-about-conspiracy-theories
[https://perma.cc/JLQ5-8WGQ].
52. Id.; see also STEVEN PINKER, ENLIGHTENMENT NOW 375 (2018) (“Mendacity, truth-
shading, conspiracy theories, extraordinary popular delusions, and the madness of crowds
are as old as our species, but so is the conviction that some ideas are right and others are
wrong.”).
53. Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Returns Fire, Calling Hillary Clinton a ‘World-
Class Liar,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/us/politics/
trump-speech-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/CJM3-5P9B]; Eli Stokols, Donald Trump Faces
His Fate, POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2016, 2:33 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-
faces-his-fate-presidential-campaign-debate/ [https://perma.cc/544M-SFRZ] (reporting on
candidate Trump’s unsubstantiated statements that the election was “rigged”).
54. Eugene Kiely, Trump Surrogates Spin ‘Birther’ Narrative, FACTCHECK.ORG (Sept. 19,
2016), http://www.factcheck.org/2016/09/trump-surrogates-spin-birther-narrative/ [https://
perma.cc/65QW-4NVK].
55. Matt Ford, Trump’s Press Secretary Falsely Claims: ‘Largest Audience Ever to Witness
an Inauguration, Period,’ ATLANTIC (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/01/inauguration-crowd-size/514058/ [https://perma.cc/E8S8-JRDK].
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Another critical narrative about the 2016 election has to do not
with the misrepresentations or falsehoods of public officials and
their surrogates, but about factually false stories published and
disseminated under the guise of actual news reporting. For example,
speakers representing themselves as legitimate news publications
posted objectively false stories reporting the fiery death of an FBI
agent investigating Hillary Clinton,56 the discovery of tens of
thousands of fraudulent Clinton votes in an Ohio warehouse,57 and
the claim that the Comet Ping Pong pizza restaurant in Washing-
ton, D.C., was a front for a sex-slavery ring led by Clinton.58 And
Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation concluded, among
other things, that the Russian government supported the production
and dissemination of fake news to influence the outcome of the
election.59 These examples merely scratch the surface of question-
able stories that were widely circulated. The phenomenon contin-
ued in the lead up to the 2020 election.60
56. Nicky Woolf, As Fake News Takes Over Facebook Feeds, Many Are Taking Satire as
Fact, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2016, 3:52 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/nov/17/
facebook-fake-news-satire [https://perma.cc/ANG6-9786].
57. Scott Shane, From Headline to Photograph, a Fake News Masterpiece, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/fake-news-hillary-clinton-cameron-
harris.html [https://perma.cc/K2DJ-G98G].
58. Cecilia Kang & Adam Goldman, In Washington Pizzeria Attack, Fake News Brought
Real Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/business/media/
comet-ping-pong-pizza-shooting-fake-news-consequences.html [https://perma.cc/Z7EZ-89L8].
59. 1 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 22 (2019), https://www.justice.
gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ9W-QBFW]. I do not mean at all to suggest that
lying is confined to conservative politicians or news purveyors, as President Bill Clinton’s
fateful and false proclamation (“I did not have sex with that woman”) should make clear. The
Clinton Presidency: Gone with Lewinsky?, L.A. SENTINEL, Sept. 23, 1998, at A1.
60. See Davey Alba, 2020 Campaigns Throw Their Hands Up on Disinformation, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/15/technology/2020-campaigns-
disinformation.html [https://perma.cc/FY3E-HJHM]; McKay Coppins, The Billion-Dollar
Disinformation Campaign to Reelect the President, ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2020, 2:30 PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/03/the-2020-disinformation-war/605530/
[https://perma.cc/3DJV-CRLK]; Alexandra S. Levine, Nancy Scola, Steven Overly & Cristiano
Lima, Why the Fight Against Disinformation, Sham Accounts and Trolls Won’t Be Any Easier
in 2020, POLITICO (Dec. 1, 2019, 6:49 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/01/fight-
against-disinformation-2020-election-074422 [https://perma.cc/7KPK-EDLN]; see also Nina
Jankowicz, Opinion, The Only Way to Defend Against Russia’s Information War, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/opinion/the-only-way-to-defend-against-
russias-information-war.html [https://perma.cc/E8ZJ-CLHG] (noting the role of “RT and
Sputnik, Russia’s state-funded foreign media networks,” in spreading disinformation
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Nor is the spread of fake news by any means limited to campaign-
related speech. The spread of inaccurate reporting encompasses
topics including voter fraud, climate change, genetically modified
organism (GMO) food products, vaccinations, and fluoride in drink-
ing water.61 Most recently, fake news stories have emerged in re-
porting about the COVID-19 pandemic and the Black Lives Matter
movement.62 Such fake news not only affects public policy, which
might ultimately yield an electoral impact, but also influences the
thinking and private behavior of numerous people around the
country. For example, such disinformation might cause parents not
to vaccinate their children.63
These examples also show that fake news is not limited to one
end of the ideological spectrum. Studies show that both conserva-
tives and liberals are equally susceptible to believing fake news
stories.64 Even though substantial amounts of empirical evidence
contradict these facts, conservatives might tend to believe in dis-
information about the prevalence of voter fraud65 and the absence
of evidence that climate change is caused by human activity,66 while
liberals might be more inclined to believe that GMO food is bad for
concerning American elections).
61. Philip Fernbach & Steven Sloman, Opinion, Why We Believe Obvious Untruths, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/opinion/sunday/why-we-believe-
obvious-untruths.html [https://perma.cc/W86H-FRCA].
62. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Davey Alba & Marc Tracy, Bill Gates, at Odds with Trump on
Virus, Becomes a Right-Wing Target, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/17/technology/bill-gates-virus-conspiracy-theories.html [https://perma.cc/6XG4-LLX6];
Arijeta Lajka, Ali Swenson, Amanda Seitz & Beatrice Dupuy, NOT REAL NEWS: Debunking
False Stories About Black Lives Matter, George Floyd, Antifa, ABC 7 CHI. (June 13, 2020),
https://abc7chicago.com/antifaprotest-black-lives-matter-lincoln-memorial/6246465/
[https://perma.cc/7AA3-RNBL].
63. See Fernbach & Sloman, supra note 61.
64. Id. (“[C]ollective delusion is not new, nor is it the sole province of the political right.”);
Scott Barry Kaufman, Liberals and Conservatives Are Both Susceptible to Fake News, but for
Different Reasons, SCI.AM.:BEAUTIFUL MINDS (Feb. 14, 2019), https://blogs.scientificamerican.
com/beautiful-minds/liberals-and-conservatives-are-both-susceptible-to-fake-news-but-for-
different-reasons/ [https://perma.cc/25PA-W2SL].
65. See Angelo Fichera, California Won’t Register ‘Illegal’ Voters, FACTCHECK.ORG (Aug.
28, 2019), https://www.factcheck.org/2018/03/california-isnt-planning-to-automatically-regis
ter-undocumented-immigrants-to-vote/ [https://perma.cc/A2QP-Z2XP].
66. See Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, How G.O.P. Leaders Came to View Climate
Change as Fake Science, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/
us/politics/republican-leaders-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/E853-KMGE].
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one’s health67 or that vaccinations cause autism.68 Moreover, the
topics of some fake news stories do not reflect an obvious ideological
tilt, as in the not-insignificant group of Americans who not only
believe fluoride in drinking water is harmful but also have per-
suaded seventy-four municipalities to ban it.69
In the years since the 2016 election, commentators have debated
whether fake news is a phenomenon that, although not new to this
era, has been exacerbated by social media and other new technolo-
gies.70 Unlike in earlier eras, stories represented as legitimate news
can be spread around the world anonymously, instantaneously, and
inexpensively with the click of a mouse.71 To many, these changed
circumstances make fake news a more ominous threat to truth and
democracy than ever before.72 Commentators who take this position
67. This tide may, however, be changing. See Jon Entine, Why Liberal Americans Are
Turning Against GMO Labeling, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2014, 2:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jonentine/2014/08/25/why-liberal-americans-are-turning-against-gmo-labeling/#682
be1d440d4 [https://perma.cc/KWP7-5DK6].
68. See Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, Bastion of Anti-Vaccine Fervor: Progressive Waldorf
Schools, N.Y.TIMES (June 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/13/nyregion/measles-
outbreak-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/7X2H-DZ49]. The political valence of the anti-
vaccination movement has become more complicated as more conservatives have started to
believe the autism myth. See Arthur Allen, How the Anti-Vaccine Movement Crept into the
GOP Mainstream, POLITICO (May 27, 2019, 8:19 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/
27/anti-vaccine-republican-mainstream-1344955 [https://perma.cc/PK5J-CZ3U] (“Not all that
long ago, the anti-vax movement was dominated by the granola-eating, pharma-distrusting
left. Conservative opposition was centered among people who also tended to see water
fluoridation as a communist plot.”).
69. Elizabeth Chuck, Science Says Fluoride in Water Is Good for Kids. So Why Are These
Towns Banning It?, NBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2018, 8:37 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/science-says-fluoride-water-good-kids-so-why-are-these-n920851 [https://perma.cc/S66F-
2ZSK]. Though contemporary concerns about fluoride seem to defy an ideological valence, in
the past there is evidence that Ku Klux Klan members feared fluoridation as a “plot[ ] against
whites.” OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, THE BEST OF ENEMIES 190 (2007).
70. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
71. See Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An Overview from General Constitutional
Law, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1637, 1651-52 (2015); see also Robinson Meyer, The Grim
Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study of Fake News, ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/largest-study-ever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104/
[https://perma.cc/B7XE-VX7K] (reporting on an MIT study of Twitter that concluded that
“[f]ake news and false rumors reach more people, penetrate deeper into the social network,
and spread much faster than accurate stories”). Although on a different scale, in the 1830s,
the wide availability of the “penny press” also made news available inexpensively to large
numbers of readers. Daya Kishan Thussu, Television News in the Era of Global Infotainment,
in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO NEWS AND JOURNALISM, supra note 40, at 362, 364.
72. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 71.
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argue that the proliferation of political mistruths has led us into
a “post-truth” era that engenders serious epistemic and public-
discourse harms.73 The concern here is not only that people will be
misled into believing false stories but also that they will begin to
disbelieve all news, even from more traditionally reliable sources.74
C. Anticipating Free Speech Concerns with Preliminary Attempts
 to Regulate Fake News
Even if the evidence does not all point in one direction, there is
good reason to be concerned about the apparent proliferation of fake
news. The foundation of democracy lies in the broad, unfettered
dissemination of ideas and information as the basis for public dis-
course.75 There may be no such thing as a false idea,76 but facts are
often objectively untrue and verifiable as such.77 To the extent that
individual listeners rely on false statements of fact in a way that
changes their behavior, such statements can cause tangible, ma-
terial harm, both to the listeners and to third parties.78
It is not only the possibility of such harms that reformers rely on
to justify calls for regulating fake news. Unlike other lies that might
be conveyed to individuals or small groups, fake news can, similar
to other harmful speech, be disseminated through social media plat-
forms over the internet instantaneously, inexpensively, and anon-
ymously.79 Thus, whatever harm might be produced by a single lie
can be spread at lightning pace around the globe.80
73. See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
845, 850-51, 866 (2018) (“We should not reflexively include fake news in the marketplace of
ideas, even as a market failure.”).
74. Hannah Arendt, Hannah Arendt: From an Interview, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Oct. 26,
1978), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1978/10/26/hannah-arendt-from-an-interview/
[https://perma.cc/N9GH-YSKV] (“If everybody always lies to you, the consequence is not that
you believe the lies, but rather that nobody believes anything any longer.”); Mark Verstraete
& Derek E. Bambauer, Ecosystem of Distrust, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 129 (2017).
75. See infra Part II.B.
76. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
77. Waldman, supra note 73, at 866.
78. See Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP.CT.REV. 161, 187-99 (dividing
harms into “second-party” [that is, listener] and “third-party” [that is, broader social] harms).
79. Tushnet, supra note 71, at 1651-62.
80. See id. at 1652-54.
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These concerns have led to at least informal calls for regulation
of fake news sites.81 Despite much noise about these concerns,
however, few concrete legislative proposals have surfaced. One
actual proposal arose in 2017, when a California legislator intro-
duced a bill that would have made it “unlawful for a person to
knowingly and willingly make, publish or circulate on an Internet
Web site, or cause to be made, published, or circulated in any
writing posted on an Internet Web site, a false or deceptive state-
ment designed to influence” the result of a “ballot measure or
election.”82 The legislator withdrew the bill after advocacy groups
raised First Amendment concerns.83 Other possible regulatory re-
sponses might include criminal laws prohibiting knowingly false
statements of fact represented as being from a legitimate news
source; authorization of civil damages actions against either the
producers of fake news or social media networks to compensate
those who can show that they were harmed by fake news; and
injunctions requiring social media sites to take down proven fake
news stories.84
Recently, some scholars have attempted to think through the
First Amendment barriers to regulating at least some forms of fake
news. The premise of such analysis is that even if fake news is
indeed covered by the Free Speech Clause, it may not always be
protected.85 While this is a valid statement in the abstract, this
Article disagrees about where the lines should be properly drawn.86
Professor Sunstein has suggested that while there are legitimate
free speech concerns with such regulations, in some cases the
81. See, e.g., Christophe Deloire, To Stop Fake News, Online Journalism Needs a Global
Watchdog, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 6, 2019, 1:14 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/06/to-
stop-fake-news-online-journalism-needs-a-global-watchdog/ [https://perma.cc/7UHL-NE7X].
82. Andrew Blake, California “Fake News” Bill Falters amid Free Speech Concerns, WASH.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/29/california-fake-
news-bill-falters-amid-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/78EJ-892D].
83. Id.
84. For a compendium of international efforts to regulate fake news, see generally David
Goldberg, Responding to ‘Fake News’: Is There an Alternative to Law and Regulation?, 47 SW.
L. REV. 417, 421-26 (2018); GLOB. LEGAL RSCH. DIRECTORATE, LIBR. OF CONG., INITIATIVES TO
CONQUER FAKE NEWS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (2019), https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo123737/
counter-fake-news.pdf [https://perma.cc/WHB7-5WU8].
85. Cass R. Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 33 HARV. J.L. &. TECH. 388,
390 (2020).
86. See infra Part IV.A.
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tangible harms caused by fake news outweigh any speech values.87
He proposes the following rebuttable presumption: “False statements
are protected unless the government can show that allowing them
will cause serious harm that cannot be avoided through a more
speech-protective route.”88 In addition, Sunstein suggests that fake
news that is also libelous might be subject to more regulation than
the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan test might allow.89 But even for
nonlibelous false statements, he suggests that some restrictions
might be upheld.
We could easily imagine a law, called the Dirty Tricks Act, that
would target such falsehoods. It might say, for example, that
speakers must pay a fine for knowingly spreading lies about
candidates for public office; it might go further and target
negligence as well. Analogues can be found in existing law, and
they have sometimes been upheld.90
Professor Sunstein relies on two lower court cases that were
decided well before the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Alvarez,91 which he concedes complicates the analysis.92 In
Alvarez, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment prohibits the state from regulating lies unless they
result in a legally cognizable harm.93 Still, Sunstein suggests that
the scope of Alvarez’s harm requirement is opaque and that it is far
from clear that a law banning false statements, intentionally
87. Sunstein, supra note 85, at 420-21.
88. Id. at 406.
89. Id. at 413-14.
90. Id. at 415 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 926 F.2d
573 (9th Cir. 1991); and then citing Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1981)). Other
scholars have recently proposed more narrow regulatory options for addressing deepfake
videos, as opposed to fake news stories. See Rebecca Green, Counterfeit Campaign Speech, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 1445, 1483-86 (2019); Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices:
American Election Law in a “Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 535 (2020). I touch on
these proposals below, but reiterate here that I have bracketed the problem of deepfake videos
for the purposes of this Article because I argue that those types of images raise fundamentally
different issues than dissemination of other fake news stories.
91. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
92. Sunstein, supra note 85, at 417.
93. 567 U.S. at 716-22.
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spread, that have “an adverse effect on the democratic process,”
would be unconstitutional.94
If fake news were categorically not covered by the First Amend-
ment, all of these proposals would be fine; if it is covered, regulatory
measures would be subject to strict or intermediate judicial scru-
tiny under the Free Speech Clause because they would be overtly
content-based.95 Indeed, both in the United States and in other
nations, the imposition of direct criminal or civil liability for
creating and disseminating fake news has been met with skepticism
because of the numerous free speech concerns.96 These critiques are
typically grounded in structural or procedural problems with such
regulations, not on the basis that fake news has any intrinsic
value.97
For instance, there might be a compelling argument against
regulating fake news drawn from negative theory justifications.
Such claims base free speech protection not on the utility of the par-
ticular expression at issue, but on a deep skepticism about allowing
the state to make determinations about what types of speech are
acceptable.98 Here, the liberty concern would be that placing the
government in the role of arbiter of what is “true” and what is “fake”
assumes a great deal of optimism that the government will act in
the public interest rather than in its own interests. As Professor
Stone once observed, a law that prohibited false statements of fact
in the course of public debate is
94. Sunstein, supra note 85, at 21. I address the scope of the material harm requirement
in Part IV.A.
95. See, e.g., Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724 (describing the test for content-based restrictions
on speech as the “most exacting scrutiny” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 642 (1994))).
96. See Dave Maass, California Bill to Ban “Fake News” Would Be Disastrous for Political
Speech, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/03/
california-bill-ban-fake-news-would-be-disastrous-political-speech [https://perma.cc/KVM3-
269X] (criticizing on free speech grounds the proposed California law discussed above); JOINT
DECLARATION ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND “FAKE NEWS”, DISINFORMATION AND PRO-
PAGANDA, ORG. FOR SEC. AND CO-OPERATION IN EUR. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.osce.org/
files/f/documents/6/8/302796.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFM5-ZST4] (“General prohibitions on the
dissemination of information based on vague and ambiguous ideas, including ‘false news’ or
‘non-objective information’, are incompatible with international standards for restrictions
on freedom of expression ... and should be abolished.”).
97. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 82.
98. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 145
(2005).
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invalid because of the danger of putting government in the
position routinely to decide the truth or falsity of all statements
in public debate. The point is not that government does not have
a legitimate interest in protecting the quality of public debate.
Surely it does. It is, rather, that there is great danger in
authorizing government to involve itself in the process in this
manner. This danger stems from the possible effect of partisan-
ship affecting the process at every level. The very power to make
such determinations invites abuse that could be profoundly
destructive to public debate.99
In the context of public discourse, this risk hardly seems worth the
potential policy benefit.
Another such claim is a practical one. It simply may be too
difficult to provide a workable legal definition of truth or falsity in
the context of public discourse.100 Lawmakers might focus on reg-
ulating only factual assertions that are objectively verifiable as
false, which is harder than it sounds.101 Some factual assertions,
such as “Obamacare will bankrupt the country” or “Trump will re-
store coal miners to their rightful place in the American economy”
might be inflammatory political rhetoric, neither intended nor heard
as literal fact. Even if every economist in the country testified that
these statements could not possibly be true, there is reason to
permit such rhetorical assertions in the context of campaigns and
policy debates.102
This type of law would also face inevitable challenges stemming
from the nature of epistemology. In understanding why people so
readily believe fake news, cognitive scientists Philip Fernbach and
Steven Sloman have explained that in complex societies, knowledge
is collective rather than individual. As they have observed,
99. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public Debate, 1993 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 127, 140.
100. See, e.g., Julie Mastrine, Defining “Fake News” Is Harder than You’d Think, OECD F.
NETWORK (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.oecd-forum.org/posts/52249-defining-fake-news-is-
harder-than-you-d-think [https://perma.cc/2UZU-32SS].
101. See, e.g., GLOB. LEGAL RSCH. DIRECTORATE, LIBR. OF CONG., supra note 84, at 4-5
(noting that Argentina has proposed to regulate fake news through the creation of a
“Commission for the Verification of Fake News,” which would check the facts on which stories
are based to ensure they are truthful).
102. Maass, supra note 96 (objecting that the proposed California fake news bill seemed
potentially to encompass “hyperbole, exaggeration, [and] poetic license”).
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Most of what you “know”—most of what anyone knows—about
any topic is a placeholder for information stored elsewhere, in a
long-forgotten textbook or in some expert’s head.
One consequence of the fact that knowledge is distributed this
way is that being part of a community of knowledge can make
people feel as if they understand things they don’t.103
If knowledge and “truth” are understood in this way, it is difficult
to imagine a law that could coherently address fake news given the
numerous available sources of knowledge and the complexity of
how we know what we “know.”
A closely related problem to the definitional challenges is that
restrictions on fake news are likely to be unconstitutionally vague,
failing to put speakers on notice of what types of statements are
prohibited.104 For example, if a law prohibits “misleading” informa-
tion, would an exaggerated characterization of an actual event
violate it? What about fake news that relies on other information
sources? Similarly, fake news regulations run the risk of violating
First Amendment overbreadth principles by sweeping within their
reach too much truthful speech, or at least things that are not
unquestionably false.105 The vagueness and overbreadth concerns
may also lead to the risk of selective enforcement; placing the
government in charge of prosecuting political liars implicates
problems that should be self-evident. Vague or overbroad fake news
laws may also lead speakers who want to convey truthful facts to
censor themselves out of fear that they might be prosecuted or sued,
creating a chilling effect of great magnitude.106 If truthful speech is
suppressed in the service of regulating fake news, any rational
deliberation justification is undermined.
These concerns mirror those that the Supreme Court has used
to conclude that other types of false factual statements must be
covered and protected by the First Amendment.107 The prime
103. Fernbach & Sloman, supra note 61. This opinion piece is based on the work reported
in the authors’ book, THE KNOWLEDGE ILLUSION (2017).
104. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253-54 (2012) (outlining the
vagueness doctrine). 
105. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (describing the overbreadth
doctrine).
106. See Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. at 253-54.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722-23 (2012) (assuming that the Act
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examples come from cases involving defamation of public officials or
public figures. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan imposed stringent
limitations on state tort liability for public defamation, not because
defamatory statements have value but because of the very real
concern that unrestricted civil litigation under defamation law may
seriously chill speech.108 In other words, the falsehoods in that
context are protected not because they have value, but as a prophy-
laxis against censorship of the truth.109
Yet another problem with fake news or political news regulations
is the possibility that they might be weaponized by political actors
to go after opponents or mainstream media outlets, accusing them
(falsely) of lying in a manner that will both undermine their
credibility and require them to expend resources defending against
the allegations.110 In this case, the cure may be worse than the
disease. The lower federal courts that have addressed state laws
prohibiting political lies have invalidated them on precisely this
ground.111
Finally, there are certain practical barriers to attempting to
regulate fake news. To the extent there is evidence that sources of
such disinformation are frequently located outside of the United
States, there are obvious problems associated with extraterritorial
enforcement. The primary way to address such speech domestically
would have to be to target platforms or impose restrictions on
individuals who recirculate false information originating from
foreign sources, which would generate its own independent First
Amendment and policy challenges.112
prohibiting false statements “would not apply to, say, a theatrical performance,” but
explaining that upholding the Act would “give government a broad censorial power,” the mere
existence of which would “cast[ ] a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free
speech, thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom”).
108. 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
109. Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First
Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1449 (2015).
110. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 82 (describing concerns that the California fake news bill
would have led to similar results); Maass, supra note 96 (same). For consideration of
procedural measures to minimize the risk of such weaponization, see Martin H. Redish &
Julio Pereyra, Resolving the First Amendment’s Civil War: Political Fraud and the Democratic
Goals of Free Expression, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 451, 480-84 (2020).
111. See, e.g., 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014).
112. See Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and Internet
Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 389 (2017) (noting a similar problem with
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II. FAKE NEWS, RATIONAL DELIBERATION, AND FIRST AMENDMENT
COVERAGE
Given these doctrinal and practical impediments to addressing
fake news, one might argue that the more direct route to allowing
government regulation would be to classify such speech as “no-
value” speech, which would result in relaxed constitutional con-
straints. Such a claim would thread together two aspects of First
Amendment doctrine—first, that speech that has no value should
not be of any concern to the Free Speech Clause, and second, that
fake news has no value because it undermines, rather than pro-
motes, rational deliberation. Speech that is not even covered by the
First Amendment is, ipso facto, not constitutionally protected,
opening the door to its regulation or banishment. This Part explores
how those arguments might look, but in Part III, this Article
explains that, while at first glance these arguments have some curb
appeal, they do not hold up under a more sophisticated understand-
ing of how people formulate knowledge, even knowledge based on
false facts, and how such knowledge has its own meaning and value
to at least some consumers of fake news.
A. Arguments Against First Amendment Coverage of Fake News
One of the signature developments of the First Amendment’s first
century was the Supreme Court’s broadening of the types of
expressive activity that qualify as speech.113 Other doctrinal changes
were, of course, also critical, including abandonment of the notion
that the Free Speech Clause only prohibits prior restraints and the
development of responses to the regulation of communication
through new platforms that were made possible by technological
regulating internet terrorist propaganda from overseas sources).
113. I accept the conventional view that modern free speech doctrine did not really exist
until the early twentieth century, when the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of federal prosecutions brought under the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918.
See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). But see David M. Rabban, The First
Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 519-20 (1981) (arguing that this
conventional view has led to “a distorted view of the social and intellectual history of the First
Amendment”).
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innovation.114 Yet, even with those latter adaptations, it is the
movement beyond core written or spoken political speech that has
created the capacious First Amendment with which we are now
familiar.115
Over this same period, legal scholars have attempted to provide
coherent theoretical explanations of First Amendment doctrine by
mapping some order onto these varied decisions.116 These efforts
have been enormously useful in enhancing our collective under-
standing of free speech theory and law. Yet, like other approaches
to uniform constitutional theory, unifying theories about why the
Constitution protects expression are ultimately unsuccessful or
incomplete.117
Surprisingly, it is only relatively recently that legal scholars have
turned their attention to the “coverage question”—the drawing of
boundaries between expression that is covered by the First Amend-
ment and the enormous amount of human communication that is
not.118 Indeed, the coverage question continues to perplex us with
regard to forms of expression as ancient as civilization, such as art,
music, and dance, as well as modes of communication made possible
only because of rapid changes in digital computer technology, such
as virtual reality and artificial intelligence.119 Drawing these lines
is an enterprise surprisingly fraught with previously unrecognized
114. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (internet); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 626 (1994) (cable television); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
369-70 (1969) (radio broadcasting); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952)
(motion pictures).
115. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1773 (2004) (describing the
boundaries of the First Amendment as being set by “the words ‘freedom of speech’”).
117. See TUSHNET ET AL., supra note 13, at 5-9.
118. See id. at 2-3; Schauer, supra note 116, at 1766-69; Mark Tushnet, The Cov-
erage/Protection Distinction in the Law of Freedom of Speech—An Essay on Meta-Doctrine in
Constitutional Law, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1073, 1083-88 (2017) (tracing the de-
velopment of the coverage/protection distinction in First Amendment case law). As Professor
Schauer has observed, “It would be somewhat more accurate to describe the First Amendment
itself as an exception to the general principle that the policy about communication, including
the policy about controlling communication, may be made in a non-constitutionalized way
without the intervention of courts or constitutional argumentation.” Frederick Schauer, The
Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 697 (1997).
119. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in
Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1141 (2008).
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complexity, yet also critical to addressing many contemporary
speech controversies.
As Frederick Schauer described it just over a decade ago,
[T]he question whether the First Amendment shows up at all is
rarely addressed, and the answer is too often simply assumed.
This inattention to the boundaries of the First Amendment does
not make the question any less important, however, and a
comprehensive examination of this long-neglected dimension of
the First Amendment is well overdue.120
He further explained that the lack of attention to the coverage
question did not in any way reduce its importance to understanding
First Amendment analysis:
[T]he boundaries of the First Amendment, far more than the
doctrine lying within those boundaries, turn out to be a function
of a complex and seemingly serendipitous array of factors that
cannot be (or at least have not been) reduced to or explained by
legal doctrine or by the background philosophical ideas and
ideals of the First Amendment. If it is true that more of the First
Amendment is explained by its boundaries than we have
previously thought, it may also be the case that less of the First
Amendment can be explained by the tools of legal and constitu-
tional analysis than we have formerly recognized.121
Coverage issues are not merely theoretical. On multiple occasions
in the past decades, the Supreme Court has addressed important
questions about whether some categories of expression should fall
completely outside of the First Amendment’s concern. Among other
things, the Court has considered whether regulation of flag burn-
ing,122 cross burning,123 public display of profanities,124 violent video
games,125 lies about having military honors,126 depictions of animal
120. Schauer, supra note 116, at 1767 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 1768.
122. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
123. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
124. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
125. Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 788 (2011).
126. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 714-15 (2012).
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cruelty,127 non-obscene sexual expression,128 and offensive protests
outside a private funeral129 trigger the concerns that animate the
Free Speech Clause. In each case, it rejected the notion that the
First Amendment is not relevant to such forms of expression.130
While Americans value free speech in the abstract,131 the impulse
to regulate expression is so commonplace that it cuts across a wide
range of social contexts and comes from all points on the political
spectrum.132 Thus, free speech controversies repeatedly find them-
selves intertwined with contemporary political and public policy
battles.133 Coverage (or rather, noncoverage) claims are therefore
likely to continue to wend their way to the Court in the coming
decade. It would not be surprising if the Court were soon to consid-
er whether regulation of the following actions count as “speech”: lies
told in political campaigns;134 citizen audiovisual recording of
events on public135 and private property,136 including recordings
127. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464-66 (2010).
128. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994).
129. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 447 (2011).
130. In doing so, the Court claimed it does not engage in any sort of cost-benefit analysis,
but instead exempts only those categories of speech that have historically been found to be
beyond the concerns of the Free Speech Clause. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471-72. This claim has
been persuasively challenged as neither normatively desirable nor historically accurate. See
Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV.L.REV. 2166, 2177-79 (2015)
(observing that neither the Supreme Court nor other federal or state courts in the pre-New
Deal period recognized categories of low-value speech on a routine basis).
131. See Richard Wike & Katie Simmons, Global Support for Principle of Free Expression,
but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech, PEW RSCH. CTR. 4 (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.pew
research.org/global/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-free-expression-but-opposition-
to-some-forms-of-speech/ [https://perma.cc/9ZSW-GZAF].
132. See id. at 19 (showing significant majority support for regulation of certain kinds of
public speech globally); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 272 (1991) (noting the prevalence of the argument that racist
speech should be regulated).
133. See, e.g., Post, supra note 132.
134. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 151-52 (2014); 281 Care Comm. v.
Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 2011).
135. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82
(1st Cir. 2011).
136. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1199-1200 (D. Idaho 2015),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th
Cir. 2018). The author discloses that he served as plaintiffs’ counsel in this case.
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taken from automated drones;137 and de minimis forms of trespass
to collect environmental data.138
The forms of human communication to which we apply the
constitutional label of “speech” are wildly varied, making the task
of putting some sort of order onto First Amendment doctrine an
unenviable task. While, as stated earlier, these efforts have been
helpful, perhaps more attention should be directed at speech from
the bottom up rather than the top down. By examining the social
practice and context of different types of speech and conceptualizing
what and how they communicate, we can come to a better under-
standing of why and when the First Amendment ought to attach,
and when the Constitution should protect against government
interference.
In some areas of First Amendment law, the Supreme Court has
determined that entire categories of expression are simply not
covered by, and therefore irrelevant to, the Free Speech Clause.
This is most commonly associated with Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, in which the Court held that “fighting words” are not a form
of speech worthy of the First Amendment’s attention.139 In these
cases, the Court has advanced a functional rationale for exiling
these forms of speech from the Constitution’s coverage. In Chaplin-
sky, the Court
said that these speech forms “are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas” and have “slight social value as a step to
truth.” While Chaplinsky is widely understood as the “no value”
speech case, it stands for more than that. What has been widely
ignored by most commentators is Chaplinsky’s conclusion that
certain forms of speech are excluded from the First Amendment
not only because they have little or no value, but also because
“any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.” Thus, a careful
reading of Chaplinsky reveals that the Court is engaging in a
137. Margot Kaminski, Drones and Newsgathering at the NTSB, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(May 9, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20140514230523/http://www.concurringopinions.
com/archives/2014/05/drones-and-newsgathering-at-the-ntsb.html [https://perma.cc/7KP8-
Z4CL].
138. W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2017).
139. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
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sort of categorical balancing that weighs the speech’s value
against its social costs.140
Unlike other content-based regulations, laws that regulate no-value
speech are not subject to any type of heightened scrutiny. By
defining these categories as nonspeech for constitutional purposes,
the Court permits government regulation of this kind of speech
with virtually no judicial review standard.141
Although the argument that lies categorically have no speech
value has now been foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Alvarez, that decision and other precedents suggest
that lies that cause cognizable harm might still not be covered by
the First Amendment.142 Employing the same methodology that it
has used in other no-value speech cases, the Court could determine
that fake news has no value because it is “no essential part of any
exposition of ideas” and has “slight social value as a step to truth.”143
By definition, fake news does nothing to convey ideas or beliefs, and
therefore does not advance public discourse in any meaningful
way.144 As the Supreme Court said, “False statements of fact are
particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking
function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an
individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counter-
speech, however persuasive or effective.”145
Not only might fake news be viewed as having no value, it might
also be seen as antispeech because it undermines public discourse
by perpetuating false statements of fact. Calls to regulate fake news
and campaign lies suggest that, like other categories of lying, false
statements in this context cause, or potentially cause, tangible
140. Chen & Marceau, supra note 12, at 664 (footnotes omitted).
141. Presumably, there might be some sort of rational basis review of government
regulations of such categories of speech, though it would likely be under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the First Amendment.
142. 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012); see also Chen & Marceau, supra note 109, at 1492-1501
(collecting cases).
143. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
144. David S. Han, Conspiracy Theories and the Marketplace of Facts, 16 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 178, 184 (2017) (“[I]n most situations where the truth of a factual matter is patently
clear, false statements produce little or no social value.”).
145. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
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social harm.146 This, in turn, factors into the coverage question
because the no-value speech cases also turn on the presumptive
harms that such expression causes, justifying the regulation of
certain categories of speech to serve “the social interest in order and
morality.”147 First, because fake news relies on intentionally false
factual premises, it distorts the truth in the marketplace of ideas.
Second, if speech protection is designed to promote rational
deliberation, it need not concern itself with lies in the political
context, which undermine rather than promote deliberation in the
same way as other falsehoods. Fake news is antithetical to the
concept of rational deliberation for exactly the reason that “high
value lies” are protected.148 It may lead to deliberation that is
rational on its own terms, but only because the listener does not
have a complete and accurate set of facts.
Parallels may be drawn to current First Amendment doctrine,
which holds that fraud149 and misleading commercial speech150 are
not covered by the First Amendment because they are viewed as
having little value and causing third-party harm. The defrauded
party may make a rational decision in turning money over to the
liar, but one that is based on a false set of background facts. That is
not the type of rational deliberation that the First Amendment is
designed to promote.
In addition to the claim that such speech has no value, fake news
may also cause harm both to listeners and, more broadly, the public
at large. With respect to listeners, fake news might cause harm in
the sense that it deprives the listener of agency. That is, fake news
can deprive listeners of their will through deception (in a manner
similar to commercial fraud).151 A related form of second-party harm
occurs when the listener directly alters her conduct in response to
146. See Michael C. Dorf & Sidney G. Tarrow, Stings and Scams: “Fake News,” the First
Amendment, and the New Activist Journalism, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 10 (2017) (noting that
“scams,” defined as “the propagation of opinions and purported statements of fact that rest
on false information,” are generally protected, whereas “stings,” which operate like undercover
investigations, may not be).
147. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
148. See Chen & Marceau, supra note 109.
149. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003). 
150. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
151. For thoughtful considerations of such theories in the context of lies, see SISSELA BOK,
LYING (1978); SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS (2014).
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the lie. In the fraud context, that would mean spending money the
listener would not otherwise invest. In the political context, it might
mean that the listener casts a vote in a different way than she
otherwise would have, or campaigns for or protests against a
particular candidate or cause based on a false understanding of the
relevant background facts.
Fake news might also cause third-party or broad social harms.
The most obvious claim is one that we have heard frequently—that
the outcome of a national election might have been different in the
absence of fake news.152 Furthermore, if fake news is later revealed
as such, the public’s faith in the electoral system, the legislative
process, and the mainstream news media might be substantially
undermined, resulting in overbroad skepticism or perhaps in
disenchantment and disengagement with the political system.
Finally, third-party harms might be even more concrete, as in the
case of the owners and patrons of the Comet Ping Pong pizza
restaurant, who were endangered when a consumer of fake news
(who believed the restaurant was a front for a sex-slavery ring led
by Hillary Clinton) fired an AR-15 rifle.153
The only conceivable public discourse value of fake news lies in its
potential to attract other speakers to dispute its accuracy. It is
sometimes said that the expression of false ideas or statements
serves the instrumental value of promoting truth because such
speech is likely to generate intense and vocal opposition, thus
leading to a rich discourse that will help society seek truth.154 The
same might be argued about false statements of fact. Fake news
should, in theory, generate counterspeech in droves, thus correct-
ing any misperceptions that might have resulted. This has not been
a mainstream argument for protecting false fact statements, how-
ever. For there is reason to believe that counterspeech might not
152. Of course, such claims are notoriously difficult to prove because so many factors may
influence voting. See Nate Silver, How Much Did Russian Interference Affect the 2016
Election?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 16, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
how-much-did-russian-interference-affect-the-2016-election [https://perma.cc/9GLA-LSZA].
153. Kang & Goldman, supra note 58.
154. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (“Even a false
statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings
about ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error.’” (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Oxford: Blackwell 1947))).
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be as effective a reaction if there are imbalances in the ability to
reach the audience that hears the falsehood or if the reactions to the
falsehoods are so rapid that there is insufficient time to address
them through discourse.155 As the adage goes, “A lie will go round
the world while truth is pulling its boots on.”156
B. The Role of Rational Deliberation in Free Speech Theory
If fake news causes legally cognizable or material speech harms,
it is because it disrupts important norms about public discourse and
undermines the ability of the marketplace of ideas to function in the
idealized manner that First Amendment theory presupposes. That
marketplace, in turn, relies on speech to promote rational delibera-
tion in American society. Traditional rationales for the constitu-
tional protection of speech, to which we now turn, match nicely with
this model.
In an effort to provide some coherence to First Amendment law,
legal scholars and philosophers have engaged each other with
competing and complementary theories about why and when the
Constitution should protect speech. It is safe to say that the theories
that have captured the imagination of the majority of scholars, and
of the Supreme Court, posit that speech must be protected as a
means to promote democratic self-governance157 and, relatedly, but
155. See infra Part IV.B.1.
156. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS, supra note 46, at 615. A variation on this saying is,
“A Lie would travel from Maine to Georgia while Truth was getting on his boots.” Anna
Gonzalez & David Schulz, Helping Truth with Its Boots: Accreditation as an Antidote to Fake
News, 127 YALE L.J.F. 315, 315 (2017). Interestingly, given the topic of this Article, the quote
is frequently falsely attributed to Mark Twain. Niraj Chokshi, That Wasn’t Mark Twain: How
a Misquotation Is Born, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/
books/famous-misquotations.html [https://perma.cc/EV74-KG7T].
157. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 75
(1948); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.L.J.
1, 26 (1971); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The
‘marketplace of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech tradition.”);
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2004) (“Probably the most important
theoretical approach to freedom of speech in the twentieth century has argued that freedom
of speech is valuable because it preserves and promotes democracy and democratic self-
government.”). For an argument that the First Amendment can be seen to advance a broader
conception of “cultural democracy,” see Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First
Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2016).
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more broadly, to facilitate the elusive search for truth.158 To be sure,
these are not the only theories touted by commentators. Unregu-
lated speech is also said to allow for individual autonomy through
self-realization159 and to promote the development of a tolerant so-
ciety.160
The democracy and truth rationales for free speech protection are
instrumental. They value speech not intrinsically, but as a means
to the end of superior public discourse about democratic processes
and other matters about which we collectively seek truth. As such,
they rely heavily on the premise that expressive liberty promotes
rational deliberation about these important and varied matters.161
That is not to say that there is actually a perfect democratic or oth-
er conceptual truth out there but that the process of seeking that
truth is socially valuable.162 Speech that promotes rational delib-
eration is therefore most highly valued and lies at the center of
both the democracy and truth-seeking speech theories.163 Rational
deliberation is also strongly rooted in the Supreme Court’s focus in
158. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 33-39 (2d ed. 1859) (arguing robust discussion
and argument leads to fuller perception of truth); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”). For an intriguing and completely
original argument that free speech theory could be advanced under a framework in which the
goal of the First Amendment is understood not to rely on “truth” per se but on knowledge, or
“justified true belief,” see Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 439, 443-44 (2019) (emphasis added).
159. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982);
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 204, 217-18 (1972).
160. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986). Finally, negative speech theorists
claim that free speech doctrine should be focused on whether the government’s motives for
regulating any particular category of speech are legitimate or suspect. See, e.g., ALEXANDER,
supra note 98, at 131 (criticizing autonomy maximization theories for failing to account for
government’s interest in balancing protected rights against each other).
161. See generally ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 145-47 (1995); Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 799, 838 (“The assumption that citizens are rational is deeply embedded in
democratic theory.”); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Assumption of Rationality, 36
VAND. L. REV. 199 (1983) (book review).
162. William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1995).
163. It is certainly no surprise, therefore, that during the brief revival of civic repub-
licanism in legal scholarship in the late twentieth century, much attention was paid to speech
as a means to facilitate rational deliberation. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman,
Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The
Ominous Implications, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 269 (1991).
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some cases on the idea that in order for speech to be relevant to the
First Amendment, it must appeal to the listener’s cognitive rea-
soning processes.164
Conversely, speech that does not promote rational deliberation is
sometimes said to not be worth protecting because it fails to serve
democracy or truth-seeking objectives. For example, some scholars
argue that regulation of “hate speech” is less worrisome than
regulation of other forms of expression because hate speech may
generate anger or other emotional responses that overcome the
ability of the listener to engage in rational deliberation.165 Consider
defamation, under which the publication of false statements of fact
that harm another’s reputation is viewed as having limited value
under the First Amendment.166 Even if the defamation plaintiff is a
public official or public figure, the speech is not covered if the
speaker acted with actual malice or reckless disregard for the
truth.167 Here, rational deliberation works differently in a way that
will become important to our discussion later. The listener may
actually rationally conclude that the information provided to her
reduces the esteem in which she may have previously held the
defamed person. But this deliberation is based on a false set of
premises, which undermines the value of the speech.
In its highest and best form, rational deliberation is an essential
corollary of both the truth-finding and democracy-promoting ra-
tionales of the First Amendment. Among those who write about free
speech theory, Professor Robert Post is probably the most prominent
proponent of the rational deliberation model. Because Professor
Post’s focus has long been on the democracy-promoting justification
for free speech law, he emphasizes the protection of conditions that
facilitate public discourse, to which the capacity for rational de-
liberation is essential.168 Accordingly, he writes that rational de-
liberation “entails consideration and evaluation of the various
164. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974).
165. See Post, supra note 132, at 275; Bradley A. Appleman, Comment, Hate Speech: A
Comparison of the Approaches Taken by the United States and Germany, 14 WIS. INT’L L.J.
422, 438 (1996).
166. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-61 (1985).
167. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
168. POST, supra note 161, at 184-85; Robert C. Post, Community and the First
Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 480 (1997).
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positions made possible by the space of critical interaction.”169 But
Post also acknowledges what he calls the “paradox of public dis-
course”: the freedom to engage in deliberation requires the pro-
tection of both norms of civility and a society of openness, and the
latter embodies “a constitutional commitment to critical interac-
tion [that] prevents the law from articulating and sustaining a
common respect for the civility rules.”170
III. THE POTENTIAL SPEECH VALUE OF FAKE NEWS
“A few months ago I told the American people that I did not trade
arms for hostages.... My heart and my best intentions still tell me
that is true, but the facts and evidence tell me it is not.” 171
As described above, it is virtually axiomatic in public discussions
of fake news that such expression undermines rational deliberation,
thereby rendering fake news not only valueless but also affirma-
tively harmful in public discourse. The search for truth and the
aspirations of democratic governance are impeded when people are
misinformed about the very factual premises of public discourse.
Fake news has the tendency to undermine deliberation, rather than
promote it.172 It both deprives listeners of agency and works a
broader epistemic harm to society. In this view, regulation of fake
news can be seen as a way of correcting a market failure in the
marketplace for truth. Because rational deliberation has such a
169. POST, supra note 161, at 146; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First
Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1117-18 (2016) (“[S]peech is widely associated in our
culture with rationality.”). Professor Post’s privileging of public discourse in speech theory is
in tension with “his tolerance for incivility.” Id. at 1117.
170. POST, supra note 161, at 147; see also Gregory P. Magarian, Religious Argument, Free
Speech Theory, and Democratic Dynamism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119, 160-61 (2011).
171. Lou Cannon, Reagan Acknowledges Arms-for-Hostages Swap, WASH. POST (Mar. 5,
1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/03/05/reagan-acknowledges-
arms-for-hostages-swap/7a5cd7cc-a112-4283-94bd-7f730ad81901/ [https://perma.cc/3E38-
3NQL] (quoting President Reagan’s response to the report of a review board that investigated
Iran-Contra).
172. “In brief, the marketplace of ideas theory does not support protecting fake news....
Disseminating fake news does not foster the type of rational debate or discussion that moves
toward an ever closer truth.” Clay Calvert, Stephanie McNeff, Austin Vining & Sebastian
Zarate, Fake News and the First Amendment: Reconciling a Disconnect Between Theory and
Doctrine, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 99, 128 (2018) (footnote omitted).
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strong hold on First Amendment theory,173 and because other forms
of falsehoods are regulated for precisely this reason,174 these
justifications for regulating fake news seem compelling.
There are multiple flaws with this generalization. First, many
scholars have made meaningful critiques of rational deliberation
as an organizing principle for free speech.175 Second, even if ration-
al deliberation is a laudable and achievable objective, the First
Amendment’s coverage of speech serves values other than promot-
ing democracy or the search for truth through facilitating rational
deliberation. Speech can also have value because it appeals not to
the rational—not to one’s cognitive processes—but to one’s self-
realization and identity as a human being.176 There are numerous
examples of speech that is both covered and protected by the First
Amendment because it facilitates emotional or spiritual experiences
and promotes one’s self-identity and place in the world, notwith-
standing the “irrationality” of those feelings. Finally, fake news can
promote a form of social cohesion or cultural connection with like-
minded people that mirrors types of speech that advance such
values in other contexts, including nationalism, religious affiliation,
and other portals of human connection.177 These arguments are all
developed in the following Sections.
A. The Limits of Rational Deliberation as a Speech Principle
The rational deliberation principle has a meaningful hold on
much free speech theory and doctrine, but it is deeply flawed. First,
extensive political science research shows that rational deliberation
is based on a view of the electoral and public policy discourse that
is not descriptively accurate.178 Second, it is also incomplete; it does
173. See supra Part II.B.
174. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
175. See infra Part III.A.
176. See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 253-54
(2011); Redish, supra note 159, at 593-94; infra Part III.B.
177. See infra Part III.C.
178. For an excellent discussion that elaborates on the role of rational processing in the
context of press audiences, see RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Freedom of the
Press in Post-Truthism America, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3588625## [https://perma.cc/Y4RT-XV4R].
396 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:357
not explain, for instance, much of what we consider to be speech—
for example, abstract art or instrumental music.
A long-standing critique of the rational deliberation principle is
that it does not comport with how speech and reasoning work, which
also undermines the truth-seeking justification of free speech.179
Recall the previous discussion about the traditional First Amend-
ment concerns about state regulation of fake news.180 There are at
least two fundamental problems with thinking about fake news as
undermining rational deliberation. First, the concept of “truth” in
political discourse is difficult to cabin. This relates to the prior
discussion of vagueness,181 but it is also more than that. One of the
most trenchant critiques of rational deliberation was developed by
Stanley Ingber in a widely cited article from a generation ago.182 He
begins by disputing the idea that there is any such thing as ob-
jective truth. As he wrote:
Although the assumption of the existence of objective truth is
crucial to classic marketplace theory, almost no one believes in
objective truth today. Historians, for example, first determine
what type of historical data to seek and then determine the
relevance of the data they find. Thus, history is founded on the
selective perception of historians rather than on any objective
historical truth. The same can be said for the pursuit of truth in
any academic, scientific, or professional discipline. The “truth”
of a theory depends on its ability to explain a phenomenon to the
judging individual’s satisfaction and on its aesthetic appeal to
that individual. Today’s truth, consequently, may become to-
morrow’s superstition.183
Rather than producing some chimerical truth or protecting dissi-
dents, he argued, the First Amendment operates to entrench the
179. See Blocher, supra note 158, at 451-56.
180. See supra Part I.C.
181. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
182. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
183. Id. at 25 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also PINKER, supra note 52, at 9
(noting that what an educated English person in 1600 would have believed to be true [witches
can cause storms at sea; a murder victim “will bleed in the presence of the murderer”] no
educated person would have believed just a century and a third later).
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status quo because the government “predisposes the individual to
accept some perspectives rather than others.”184
Ingber goes on to suggest that rejection of the objective truth
model should also draw into question other marketplace assump-
tions, including the premise that people consume speech and process
their thinking in a rational way.185 Similarly, as Professor Frederick
Schauer has noted, placing one’s faith in the truth model “requires
a substantial degree of faith in pervasive human rationality and an
almost willful disregard of the masses of scientific and marketing
research to the contrary.”186 Ingber goes on to observe that some
First Amendment doctrine allows suppression of speech because
it does not promote rational discourse, but rather surpasses the
“bounds of persuasion.”187 For example, he points out that legal
rules such as the fighting words doctrine seem to allow the govern-
ment “to limit irrational responses to communications by controlling
the form in which such messages are presented.”188 This wrongly
assumes, however, that people can distinguish “between a message’s
substance and the distortion caused by its form and focus.”189
Ultimately, Ingber argues that the rational deliberation model
fails to account for the persuasive power of emotional, rather than
rational, appeals through speech:
As Professor C. Edwin Baker has recognized, emotional appeals,
whether rational or not, are highly potent: “‘subconscious’
repressions, phobias, or desires influence people’s assimilation
of messages; and, most obviously, stimulus-response mecha-
nisms and selective attention and retention processes influence
understanding or perspectives.” These processes, coupled with
the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, insulate individuals
from messages inconsistent with those perspectives that further
184. Ingber, supra note 182, at 28; see also id. at 48 (“The marketplace of ideas is more
myth than reality. In practice, communications flowing into the market largely reflect
conventional political, economic, and social points of view.” (footnote omitted)). But see Lidsky,
supra note 161, at 835-49 (arguing that even taking into account the greater understanding
of the way we process information from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology, the
rationality ideal should not be discarded).
185. Ingber, supra note 182, at 31-32.
186. Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLAL.REV. 897, 909 (2010).
187. Ingber, supra note 182, at 33.
188. Id. at 32.
189. Id. at 31.
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their perceived self-interests. Marketplace outcomes therefore are
determined more by the packaging of the message and the
psychological predispositions of the listeners than by any rational
process. Consequently, the market model’s reliance on public
rationality is, at best, misplaced.190
Building on Ingber’s critique, and notwithstanding the
Meiklejohnian ideal,191 not all decisions about politics and elections
rely on either objective factual truth or rational deliberation.
Rational deliberation hypothesizes a high-functioning democracy in
which people may be persuaded by fact and reason: an almost
utopian, Enlightenment ideal that some commentators refer to as
the “folk theory” of democracy.192 But studies show numerous flaws
in this premise. As Professors Achen and Bartels observe, “[A]
substantial body of scholarly work demonstrat[es] that most
democratic citizens are uninterested in politics, poorly informed,
and unwilling or unable to convey coherent policy preferences
through ‘issue voting.’”193 From this perspective, one limit to the
rational deliberation theory is an information problem. “[T]he
problem is not that voters are necessarily irrational, but that most
voters have very little real information, even about crucially
important aspects of national political life.”194 The information they
do have may be of uncertain provenance. As Professors Fernbach
and Sloman note, “People fail to distinguish what they know from
what others know because it is often impossible to draw sharp
boundaries between what knowledge resides in our heads and what
resides elsewhere.”195
But that is not the only problem. Much evidence shows that
people make decisions about everything from how to cast their votes
190. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Ingber makes other important
arguments about the distortion of the marketplace through the power of government to
control information that depart from this Article’s focus. See id. at 36-48.
191. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H.ACHEN &LARRY M.BARTELS,DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS 277
(2016) (“In the folk theory of democracy, objective facts about the political world transcend
whatever disagreements arise from our differing moral commitments.”).
193. Id. at 14. Of course, this is a descriptive, not normative, account. Scholars who study
voting behavior do not think these findings are desirable.
194. Id. at 284.
195. Fernbach & Sloman, supra note 61.
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to which television set to buy based on a combination of reasons that
are not fully rational. Most political science studies argue that party
affiliation is the single most important factor in determining how
individuals cast their votes in elections; in the same manner that
consumers have brand loyalty to Apple or IBM, people frequently
vote simply on party lines.196 One might initially respond that
basing voting decisions on party affiliation can itself be a form of
rational behavior, in that the voter chooses to associate herself with
a party because its platform most closely matches her views.197 But
that does not appear to be the case either. Professor Gabriel S. Lenz
has found
surprisingly little evidence that voters judge politicians on their
policy stances. They rarely shift their votes to politicians who
agree with them—even when a policy issue has just become
highly prominent, even when politicians take clear and distinct
stances on the issue, and even when voters know these stances.
Instead, I usually find the reverse: voters first decide they like a
politician for other reasons, then adopt his or her policy views.198
Again, we might even construe this as rational behavior given the
resources that must be invested to stay informed about a wide range
of public policy issues, but that is not the type of rational delibera-
tion the First Amendment is supposed to facilitate. In a particularly
dismal description of these phenomena, Achen and Bartels suggest
that “[m]ost of the time, voting behavior merely reaffirms voters’
partisan and group identities. They do not rethink their fundamen-
tal political commitments with every election cycle.... They sound
like they are thinking, and they feel like they are thinking. We all
do.”199
Understood from this perspective, laws regulating fake news may
be but failed attempts to force people to behave rationally in a uni-
verse that is full of irrationality. Note that this is slightly different
196. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 192, at 294.
197. See id. at 267-68.
198. GABRIEL S. LENZ, FOLLOW THE LEADER? 3 (2012) (emphasis added). But see id. at 7
(noting that some researchers believe democracy more closely resembles an ideal in which
voters behave rationally by voting for politicians who promote policies they agree with).
199. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 192, at 294.
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from the market failure problem. Proposals to regulate fake news
implicitly assume that it is invalid, or is at least suboptimal, for
voters to make a decision based on things other than fact, such as
emotion, instinct, passion, or any number of other nonrational fac-
tors.200 But the latter factors may, on the ground, have a greater
impact on voting and other behavior than the rational deliberation
model assumes.
Another critique of rational deliberation theory is that it is
substantially underinclusive because it does not account for a lot of
communicative activity that is, or should be, unequivocally counted
as speech. Such a failing presents serious problems for rational
deliberation as a goal for the First Amendment. Rational delibera-
tion explains nothing about why expression that appeals to things
other than cognitive reasoning counts as speech.
As mentioned above, an alternate or supplemental free speech
theory focuses not on expression as a means to a functioning
democracy or the search for truth, but on the speech’s capability to
promote individual self-realization.201 This autonomy-based theory
of free speech, as described by Professor Redish,
can be interpreted to refer either to development of the individ-
ual’s powers and abilities—an individual “realizes” his or her full
potential—or to the individual’s control of his or her own destiny
through making life-affecting decisions—an individual “realizes”
the goals in life that he or she has set. In using the term, I
intend to include both interpretations.202
The self-realization theory is much more effective than either
democracy-promotion or truth-seeking in explaining why certain
types of nonverbal, or verbal but meaningless, expression—such as
abstract art, instrumental music, and nonsense—are covered by the
First Amendment. Indeed, complete reliance on the rational de-
liberation principle would suggest that they are not. As I have
200. One response to this suggestion might be that those factors themselves suggest
rational decision-making. Rational deliberation as it relates to policy preferences need not be
limited to pure questions of fact.
201. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
202. Redish, supra note 159, at 593.
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suggested elsewhere, there are good reasons for the First Amend-
ment’s coverage of, for example, music:
Perhaps the most intuitive argument for music’s expressive
value is its ability to evoke noncognitive responses in listeners, as
well as in its composers and performers. That is, completely
dissociated from titles, linguistic signals, and other forms of art,
instrumental music can be expressive in important ways that
elicit emotional and spiritual responses. The emotional claim
therefore perhaps presents the cleanest analytical argument for
categorizing purely instrumental music as a form of constitu-
tionally protected expression.203
Thus, wordless music can promote in both the “speaker” and lis-
tener a type of pure emotional experience that fulfills one’s human
potential, rather than a cognitive one.204
Though presumed to be speech, instrumental music bears almost
none of the features of human communication that we ordinarily
associate with the First Amendment. First, and perhaps most obvi-
ously, instrumental music conveys no particularized, or even gen-
eral, “message” that we could understand as speech.205 It conveys no
fact, no idea, no tangible insight. Moreover, from the perspective of
the listener, instrumental music elicits no specific cognitive re-
sponse and does not necessarily stimulate rational deliberation.
Similar arguments can be made that nonrepresentational art,
which also does not appeal to cognitive functioning or reason, there-
fore does not promote rational deliberation either. Finally, actual
verbal expression that represents nonsense, such as the absurd
phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,”206 can be construed as speech, but
certainly cannot be understood as promoting rational deliberation.
Even expression that inspires cognitive processing and thereby
affects thought can sometimes reach the mind in ways that are not
related to rationality. To the extent some forms of entertainment,
203. See TUSHNET ET AL., supra note 13, at 60 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 60-65.
205. Id. at 65.
206. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). For a discussion of nonsense as
speech, see TUSHNET ET AL., supra note 13, at 119-32; see also Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and
the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First Amendment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1423,
1425-26 (2014).
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such as movies, are speech, it is because they can inspire fear,
sadness, laughter, and other emotional experiences, either coexten-
sively with or independent of rational thinking.
My primary point here is that rational deliberation as a goal of
free speech does not do the work necessary to clarify the boundaries
between protected expression and nonspeech. Rational deliberation
has value in thinking about speech and its protection, but its sub-
stantial underinclusiveness is a critical shortcoming. The following
Sections explore whether the self-realization theory can be affirma-
tively invoked to support the idea that fake news has free speech
value in its capacity to meaningfully promote both individual
identity and social cohesion.
B. Fake News May Promote Self-Realization by Facilitating
 Expressive Experiential Autonomy
A second, crucial issue in thinking about fake news regulation as
justifiable on the ground that it undermines rational deliberation is
that fake news may have speech value independent of its ability to
promote such deliberation. Human communication is far more
complex and varied than the rational deliberation model presup-
poses. An increasing number of legal scholars have argued that
free speech doctrine cannot be fully explained by a single, unified
theory, but that multiple theories, sometimes varying by context,
may be necessary to understand the complex map of the law.207 As
argued throughout this Section, the democracy-promoting and
truth-seeking goals of the First Amendment fail to explain much of
what we value as speech and other models might be understood to
reflect the value that fake news might provide to its listeners.
Consider what we know about how fake news operates and how
people consume it. Setting aside the question of the speaker’s
motivation, whether it be to earn money through web clicks or to
influence the outcome of an election, the audience for fake news may
in important ways be self-determined. That is, fake news in many
cases is directed at an audience that is predisposed to consume it or
207. TUSHNET ET AL., supra note 13, at 8-9. This is in no way limited to free speech law but
also extends to other aspects of constitutional theory. See generally Andrew Jordan,
Constitutional Anti-Theory, 107 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2019).
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may even seek it out. Critics of the fake news phenomenon have
suggested that such speech is harmful because it allows people to
remain in their “filter bubbles,” which is damaging to the ideal of
open public discourse.208 Given the nature of individual news
consumption, however, it is hard to figure out how to address this
issue. The phenomena of selective exposure and confirmation bias
suggest that people choose news outlets or pursue and read stories
because those stories are likely to be consistent with their precon-
ceived worldviews.209 “If reason is designed to generate sound
judgments, then it’s hard to conceive of a more serious design flaw
than confirmation bias.”210 There are serious barriers to addressing
this problem; it would surely violate the First Amendment and
perhaps other aspects of the Constitution to compel individuals to
follow news sources and consume information chosen by others.
Lots of what we value as speech has to do with the ability to
process thought, belief, and emotion that may not necessarily be
rational, but is nonetheless critical to the ability to define ourselves.
In its own social context, fake news may not be that different from
other forms of communication that we value even though they do
not involve truth in the literal sense. What if fake news, like art,
music, and other forms of nonpropositional expression, promotes
valuable internal, noncognitive experiences? Not all important
brain functioning or processing of communication is cognitive, and
such communication can promote senses of happiness, sadness,
anger, wonder, and a range of other emotions.211 In this sense, fake
news might have value to its listeners in some of the same ways
that music does. Indeed, a consumer of fake news might even
208. Mostafa M. El-Bermawy, Your Filter Bubble Is Destroying Democracy, WIRED
(Nov. 18, 2016, 5:45 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/filter-bubble-destroying-democracy/
[https://perma.cc/6VM9-SNHV]. Filter bubbles were much less likely to exist when people got
most of their information from traditional speech intermediaries such as the three major
television networks and large, national newspapers.
209. FARHAD MANJOO, TRUE ENOUGH 30 (2008); Kevin Quealy, We Avoid News We Don’t
Like. Some Trump-Era Evidence, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/02/21/upshot/how-readers-react-to-political-news-they-dont-like-they-ignore-
it.html [https://perma.cc/48Q6-SUEE].
210. Elizabeth Kolbert, Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds, NEW YORKER (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-our-minds
[https://perma.cc/8U4N-LN4R].
211. TUSHNET ET AL., supra note 13, at 60-65. 
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recognize that such stories feed her sense of emotional fulfillment,
and may even be “music to my ears.”
It is indisputable that art, music, and other forms of nonverbal
communication count as “speech” for First Amendment purposes.212
But how can the freedom of speech protect things that are, quite
literally, not speech? Turning to the self-realization theory, I have
previously written that instrumental music must be considered to
be speech in part because it has the power to convey cultural,
religious, nationalistic, and other social values, and promote emo-
tional expression and experience in its composers, performers, and
listeners.213 Indeed, as a social practice, music may be even more
powerful than overt, verbal expression in specific instances.214
The emotional power of speech falls neatly within the autonomy
or self-realization justification for constitutional protection. As
Edwin Baker wrote, “A person’s autonomy might reasonably be
conceived as her capacity to pursue successfully the life she
endorses—self-authored at least in the sense that, no matter how
her image of a meaningful life originates, she now can endorse that
life for reasons that she accepts.”215
Fake news may operate in ways similar to art and music in that
it might unlock a certain way of viewing or experiencing the world.
It may be opening up a false or artificial world, but the regulation
of fake news could be conceptualized in a manner not that different
from censoring art, or video games, or virtual reality experiences, all
of which might create or inspire a different or alternative worldview.
Understood in this way, lies actually have some social value, not
just in a utilitarian sense by promoting other public good but also
by enhancing individuals’ ability and freedom to internally expe-
rience self-realization.216
212. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (observing, though without elaboration, that the First Amendment “unquestionably
shield[s the] painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse
of Lewis Carroll”).
213. TUSHNET ET AL., supra note 13, at 66.
214. Id. at 52-54.
215. Baker, supra note 176, at 253.
216. See Redish, supra note 159, at 593. Of course, even if this view is valid, that does not
address the possible harms caused by fake news. As I will address in the last Section, perhaps
there are better ways to address such harms without directly interfering with the personal
appeal of fake news.
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We can look as far back as John Stuart Mill to see that this is not
a new phenomenon and that individual emotional experience with
speech may be more powerful than reason.
So long as an opinion is strongly rooted in the feelings, it gains
rather than loses in stability by having a preponderating weight
of argument against it. For if it were accepted as a result of
argument, the refutation of the argument might shake the
solidity of the conviction; but when it rests solely on feeling, the
worse it fares in argumentative contest, the more persuaded its
adherents are that their feeling must have some deeper ground,
which the arguments do not reach; and while the feeling
remains, it is always throwing up fresh entrenchment of
argument to repair any breach made in the old.217
If the notion that fake news might promote expressive experien-
tial autonomy seems counterintuitive, consider the comparison to
the emotional power of religious expression to its audiences. The
latter is another powerful example of the type of speech that is
indisputably of substantial social value but may not always lead to
rational deliberation in the traditional sense to the extent that it is
based on faith and values that are not grounded in fact. These
thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and experiences may be rational on their
own terms, but are not rational in the way that we think about that
term under speech theory. Similarly, speech about profound moral
questions (whether from a religious perspective or not), such as the
meaning of existence or how to define life, involve important
expressions of principles that do not necessarily rely on rationality
and cannot be said to be either true or false.
Some hints of this type of thinking about speech can be found in
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in United States v. Alvarez, the
Court’s decision invalidating the Stolen Valor Act, which made it a
federal crime to lie about having been awarded military honors.218
Breyer noted at one point that lies sometimes serve valuable social
functions, such as “in social contexts, where they may prevent
embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice,
217. JOHN STUART MILL, The Subjection of Women, in THREE ESSAYS BY JOHN STUART
MILL 425, 427 (Oxford Univ. Press 1912) (1869).
218. 567 U.S. 709, 713, 715-16 (2012).
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provide the sick with comfort, or preserve a child’s innocence; in
public contexts, where they may stop a panic or otherwise preserve
calm in the face of danger.”219 He also worried about the regulation
of lying in the context of broad, theological or philosophical think-
ing, noting the substantial danger in permitting the government to
act as an arbiter of truth in those contexts.
As the dissent points out, “there are broad areas in which any
attempt by the state to penalize purportedly false speech would
present a grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful
speech.” Laws restricting false statements about philosophy,
religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and the like raise
such concerns, and in many contexts have called for strict
scrutiny.220
This suggests a special concern with how the government might
define what a lie means within these fields, because in many
instances those are areas in which what is true is either highly
debatable, unverifiable, or subject only to considerations of faith and
value. Thus, when we talk about promoting religious deliberation
through speech, we may not necessarily mean rational deliberation
in the ordinary sense of that phrase.
Yet another context in which to explore this way of thinking about
fake news is in cases that have addressed whether there are free
speech rights for people who represent themselves as fortune-
tellers and who charge money for their services. This has caught the
attention of some legal scholars who think about lying and the First
Amendment,221 and has been the subject of some litigation in the
lower courts.222 Some have claimed (mostly unsuccessfully) that
fortune-tellers should be exempt from fraud laws and other govern-
ment regulation because they are engaged in speech.223 In response
219. Id. at 733 (Breyer, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 731-32 (citation omitted).
221. See, e.g., Catherine J. Ross, Incredible Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 383-400 (2018);
Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory
of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1272-73 (1983); Jonathan D. Varat, Decep-
tion and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1111-12 (2006).
222. See, e.g., Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013).
223. Id. at 565-70.
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to these claims, the government has argued that the speech is false
and therefore falls outside the scope of the First Amendment.224 The
fortune-tellers have claimed that their services are comparable to
those of a spiritual adviser or religious counselor, and that such
expression occurs in the context of a social relationship in which the
listeners understand that fortune-telling is predictive speech.225
Noting that many people sincerely believe that they have the
power to tell the future, courts have concluded that such expression
is not necessarily exempt from First Amendment coverage on the
ground that it is false.226 As the Fourth Circuit held, “If, as the
County contended at oral argument, all predictive speech were
inherently deceptive, most religious prophecy, financial prognosti-
cation, and medical diagnosis would fall outside the scope of con-
stitutional protection.”227
One might distinguish the fortune-teller situation from fake news
on the ground that, like purchasers of the National Enquirer or
other tabloid news publications, customers of fortune-tellers know-
ingly enter into a social relationship in which they either want to be
lied to or suspend disbelief for the purpose of entertainment or
emotional sustenance. Moreover, even in cases in which the cus-
tomer knows the fortune-teller’s speech to be false, she may wish to
experience the lie because it provides some form of emotional or
even spiritual comfort, as in the case of the fortune-teller conveying
the “news” that a departed loved one is at peace. In the same way,
consumers of fake news may seek it out for entertainment, or may
believe the facts conveyed because they make them feel better about
their place in the universe.
By comparing fake news and fortune-telling to Mozart, Pollack,
and religious expression, this Article does not mean to in any way
diminish the latter. Rather, it fully considers whether serious
arguments exist to defend the former on grounds of what I call
expressive experiential autonomy. None of these forms of expression
involve fact-driven speech or communication designed to convey a
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 567.
227. Id. at 566 (citing Nefedro v. Montgomery County, 996 A.2d 850, 858 (Md. 2010)).
Interestingly, the fortune-teller in that case provided evidence about a wide range of
inspiration for her work, including “music, music, music!” Id. at 564.
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message that appeals to cognitive reasoning. They also, therefore,
do not rely on the rational deliberation principle. We might value
these expressions under the First Amendment not because they
promote rational deliberation, but because they produce some other
kind of experience that we understand as experiential autonomy.
There is substantial support for this understanding of the
personal emotional experience with expression found in disciplines
other than law, including political science and social and cognitive
psychology research. We can learn much from these experts who
closely study partisanship, communication, and disinformation
campaigns. Turning again to political scientists Achen and Bartels,
we find support not only for the irrationality of voter behavior but
also for the role of emotional attachment to parties and how that
influences belief. Their studies “find that partisan loyalties strongly
color citizens’ views about candidates, issues, and even ‘objective’
facts. Citizens’ political preferences and beliefs are constructed from
emotional or cognitive commitments whose real bases lie else-
where.”228 Similarly, an extensive study of Twitter by scientists at
MIT concluded that fake news is more frequently retweeted in part
because “fake news evokes much more emotion than the average
tweet.... Fake tweets tended to elicit words associated with surprise
and disgust, while accurate tweets summoned words associated with
sadness and trust.”229
This understanding of the manner in which people experience
fake news also seems to be reflected in the work of psychologists,
who study the ways in which human communication is processed.
First, the well-known concept of confirmation bias suggests that
people will gravitate toward news sources and candidates whose
expression is consistent with their own worldviews.
Research indicates that both offline and online, people tend to
discuss politics with like-minded others. Similarly, they tend to
select like-minded media sources. This is not surprising given
that theory and empirical research in cognitive psychology
suggest that all of us are prone to “confirmation bias”—the bias
to selectively search for, believe, and confirm that which we
228. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 192, at 269 (emphasis added).
229. Meyer, supra note 71.
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already think we know. This includes searching for evidence
that confirms our preexisting beliefs.230
Furthermore, both theoretical claims and empirical evidence exist
to demonstrate individuals’ tendency toward what social psycholo-
gists call “shared reality.” Here, “reality refers to people’s subjective
perception of something as being real and truthful, not to whether
something can be corroborated as real or truthful from an external
(scientific) perspective.”231 The motives for listeners to adapt to
shared reality are, in part, epistemic.232 Here, epistemic motives
mean not the goal of knowledge per se but “the need to achieve a
valid and reliable understanding of the world.”233
An understanding of fake news as a form of valuable expression
and social experience may also lead us back to considering whether
other forms of human communication might be recognized as
speech. In the same way that art or fake news communicates in a
manner unconnected to rational deliberation, so might other forms
of expression. One form of communication that has been subject to
this debate is pornography. While Professor Schauer has argued
that depictions of sexually explicit acts or images should not count
as speech for First Amendment purposes because they do not appeal
to cognitive processes,234 others have questioned whether the emo-
tional and experiential aspects of such expression suggest that it
has speech value.235
230. Toni M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, and
Emerging Evidence on Civility and Effective Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 375,
414 (2012) (footnotes omitted); see also Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases,
Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 673
(2006).
231. Gerald Echterhoff, E. Tory Higgins & John M. Levine, Shared Reality: Experiencing
Commonality with Others’ Inner States About the World, 4 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 496, 497-
98 (2009).
232. Id. at 500. They are also relational. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
233. Echterhoff et al., supra note 231, at 500.
234. Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in
the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 923 (1979); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 591 (“[P]ornography
is ‘low-value’ speech, entitled to less protection from government control than most forms of
speech.”).
235. Chen, supra note 14, at 440-41.
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Or, consider other forms of communication that stimulate brain
functioning in noncognitive manners. In a recent column, Richard
Friedman examined how mathematical equations are experi-
enced.236 He reported about a neuroscience study that examined
mathematicians’ brains while they were thinking about a range of
equations.237 While, of course, equations can promote purely cog-
nitive functioning, the study found something quite different.
The researchers found a strong correlation between finding an
equation beautiful and activation of the medial orbitofrontal
cortex, a region of the prefrontal cortex just behind the eyes.
This is the same area that has been shown to light up when
people find music or art beautiful, so it seems to be a common
neural signature of aesthetic experience.238
As I have suggested in prior work, neuroscience may provide a clue
to how we experience nonverbal stimulation through the arts as
well.239 Moreover, not all of us experience the same forms of ex-
pression in an identical manner. Numerous musical artists from
Duke Ellington to the pop singer Pharrell Williams are reported to
have a condition known as synesthesia.240 Though there are
different types, the pop star Lorde has “sound-to-color synesthesia—
when she hears certain notes and sounds, corresponding colors
appear—and she describes making music in intensely visual
terms.”241 Perhaps we can gain additional insights about a wide
range of nonverbal communication through other studies of such
neurological phenomena.
If fake news paradoxically has this value because it promotes
expressive experiential autonomy, it is more difficult to suggest that
it could be prohibited or otherwise regulated, independent of the
236. Richard A. Friedman, Opinion, The World’s Most Beautiful Mathematical Equation,




239. TUSHNET ET AL., supra note 13, at 64-65.
240. Ryan Dombal, What the Hell Is Synesthesia and Why Does Every Musician Seem to
Have It?, PITCHFORK (Jan. 31, 2014), https://pitchfork.com/thepitch/229-what-the-hell-is-
synesthesia-and-why-does-every-musician-seem-to-have-it/ [https://perma.cc/N2RE-LFAA].
241. Jonah Weiner, The Return of Lorde, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/04/12/magazine/the-return-of-lorde.html [https://perma.cc/G4A8-47XY].
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structural or procedural concerns offered by traditional free speech
theory. Understood in this way, fake news may be conceived of as
expression that promotes deliberative autonomy, not in the sense of
rational deliberation, but because it may provoke and capture
ineffable feelings.
C. Fake News May Promote Social Cohesion
A separate but related claim is that to some extent, consumers’
connection and relationship to a particular fake news purveyor and
to each other may be an important and valuable form of social
cohesion. Understood in this way, fake news has both internal and
external social value. Typically, when a person clicks “like” or
retransmits a social media message, she both signals her affiliation
with the content of that message and identifies herself as a member
of a group that shares some common worldview or value structure.
After all, a less pejorative word for “filter bubble” might be commu-
nity.242
Other types of communication that we commonly understand to
be speech under the First Amendment share this value. Return to
the example of instrumental music: in addition to the facilitation of
emotional experience, such expression can also serve a social-
cohesion function. “[I]n music’s expression of culture, it serves
important social functions by connecting people within and between
different communities, and its recognition as a form of speech
ensures that government efforts to establish a cultural orthodoxy,
like attempts to create a political or religious orthodoxy, are
thwarted.”243
Again, this understanding of the social cohesion function of fake
news is supported by political science and psychology research. The
research on shared realities, discussed above, reflects that relational
motives are furthered by fake news because “[s]hared realities with
others are attractive because they allow individuals to experience
a more valid and reliable view of the world and to obtain or main-
tain a sense of connectedness and belonging.”244 This is consistent
242. See El-Bermawy, supra note 208.
243. TUSHNET ET AL., supra note 13, at 66.
244. Echterhoff et al., supra note 231, at 500; see also Amanda Taub & Brendan Nyhan,
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with the idea that people consume fake news to further their sense
of community. It also may help explain why fake news is not only
effective but also may be valuable to its consumers without regard
to objective truth.
Political parties may be the most strongly identifiable affinity
group that reflects this type of community. Indeed, research shows
that partisanship affects how people consume information and what
they believe. Achen and Bartels concluded “that citizens’ perceptions
of parties’ policy stands and their own policy views are significantly
colored by their party preferences. Even on purely factual questions
with clear right answers, citizens are sometimes willing to believe
the opposite if it makes them feel better about their partisanship
and vote choices.”245
One can observe this type of social cohesion in communities that
view institutions with distrust and that hold a heavy anti-elitism
bias. It is not uncommon to read or hear derisive remarks about
consumers of fake news as ignorant rubes, or worse.246 Rather than
encouraging people to be more discriminating about information
sources, this kind of characterization may in fact provoke a
defensive community-building reaction, simply reinforcing the
community’s worldview. Furthermore, as we have seen, these views
may not be caused by just ignorance but by powerful forces such as
partisanship.247 As one observer noted, “Sharing [fake news] on
social media is a way to show public support for one’s partisan
Why People Continue to Believe Objectively False Things, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/upshot/why-objectively-false-things-continue-to-be-
believed.html [https://perma.cc/GT2M-SN4L].
245. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 192, at 17 (emphasis added).
246. See Amanda Taub, The Real Story About Fake News Is Partisanship, N.Y.TIMES (Jan.
11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/upshot/the-real-story-about-fake-news-is-
partisanship.html [https://perma.cc/8JR6-G7MR] (“Consider the thinly disguised sneer in
most articles and editorials about so-called fake news. The very phrase implies that the people
who read and spread the kind of false political stories that swirled online during the election
campaign must either be too dumb to realize they’re being duped or too dishonest to care that
they’re spreading lies. But the fake-news phenomenon is not the result of personal failings.
And it is not limited to one end of the political spectrum. Rather, Americans’ deep bias against
the political party they oppose is so strong that it acts as a kind of partisan prism for facts,
refracting a different reality to Republicans than to Democrats.”).
247. Id.
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team—roughly the equivalent of painting your face with team col-
ors on game day.”248
Several phenomena identified by behavioral economists and
cognitive and social psychology researchers provide some empirical
support for the idea that fake news promotes social cohesion. First,
there is the tendency for people to engage in “motivated reasoning”
or “motivated cognition,” which nudges them toward processing
information in a way that satisfies objectives other than learning or
discovery of truth.249 These concepts are closely related to the idea
of “expressive rationality,” which holds that views “arise from
individuals’ tendency to form beliefs that signal their membership
in and loyalty to identity-defining cultural groups.”250 In conjunction
with the current discussion, one scholar has observed that “[p]eople
affirm or deny [their] beliefs to express not what they know but who
they are.”251 A second phenomenon is the use of heuristics—short-
cuts in the reasoning process that frequently lead people to biased
conclusions that do not comport with the truth outcomes they would
likely reach with unlimited time and resources.252 The more we
learn about varying influences on cognitive reasoning, the harder it
becomes to rely on the role of speech in promoting truth-finding.
248. Id.; see also Jane R. Bambauer, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, The Nonrandom
Walk of Knowledge, 37 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1) (on file with
author) (“[T]he emergent camps of entrenched beliefs are not (necessarily) caused by any
failing in human rationality or by the schemes of a manipulative corporation; they are caused
by the influence our individual pursuits of friendship and camaraderie have over the course
of gathering evidence.”).
249. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term-Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-20
(2011); see also PINKER, supra note 52, at 353; Michael Thaler, The “Fake News” Effect:
Experimentally Identifying Motivated Reasoning Using Trust in News (May 27, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mthaler/files/mthaler_fake-news-
effect_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUY9-5MLG].
250. Dan M. Kahan & Keith E. Stanovich, Rationality and Belief in Human Evolution
(Annenberg Pub. Pol’y Ctr., Working Paper No. 5, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2838668 [https://perma.cc/CS6F-ERVF].
251. PINKER, supra note 52, at 357; see also Jones & Sun, supra note 178, at 23 (“Recent
research suggests that one of the primary goals of motivated reasoning is the expression and
protection of group identity—such as one’s cultural or political identity.”).
252. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (explaining
judgment heuristics); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
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Moreover, the more marginalized the group is or perceives itself
to be, the more powerful the cohesive effect of fake news stories that
bind its members together as a community. As Professor David Han
wrote, “[C]onspiracy theories thus tend to be attractive to the po-
litically powerless—those seeking ‘an explanation for the hidden
and seemingly mysterious workings of political power.’”253 He
continues:
To such adherents, patent falsity is, in fact, the central allure of
these theories: the fact that the theories so directly reject what
is obviously true to society at large fits an underlying ideological
belief that society must wake up and challenge all of our trusted
authorities—including any “truths” pronounced from such
authorities—lest our apathy relegate us to the role of helpless
and manipulable pawns.254
Another sign that fake news performs a social cohesion function
comes from the words of adherents to different social movements.
Their distrust of the government and other institutions runs deep
and may lead them to believe at least some misinformation.255
Members of the gun-rights movement, for example, though they
may have legitimate policy interests justifying their resistance to
regulation, may also be driven in part by a notion that the govern-
ment is not just trying to limit their access to firearms but is trying
to take away their way of life.
Then-NRA Executive Vice President J. Warren Cassidy once
remarked, “You would get a far better understanding of the NRA
if you approached us as if you were approaching one of the great
religions of the world.” Religions start with an assertion that
cannot be proved: Jesus rising from the dead; Moses shoeless
before the burning bush; Joseph Smith translating the Book of
Mormon; the Koran as God’s revelation.
253. Han, supra note 144, at 191 (quoting Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where’s the Harm? Free
Speech and the Regulation of Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091, 1100 (2008)).
254. Id.
255. Or, sometimes, their leaders may actually be in the government, relying on their
loyalty to disrupt other institutions. See Sidney Tarrow, Rhythms of Resistance: The Anti-
Trumpian Moment in a Cycle of Contention, in THE RESISTANCE: THE DAWN OF THE ANTI-
TRUMP OPPOSITION MOVEMENT 187, 192-93 (David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow eds., 2018).
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Many in this country have seized upon the absolute God-given
right to bear arms without any restraints of government as their
primary devotion.256
Similar sentiments can be seen in modern believers in a flat
earth,257 astrology,258 and witches.259
Nor is there a particular ideological valence to this social cohesion
function. Professor Bhagwat makes this point nicely, in arguing for
a more holistic view of the distinct rights within the First Amend-
ment.
Rational discourse is certainly (at least ideally) a part of our
system of self-governance, but it is just a part. Associations can
bond citizens on profoundly emotional terms such as love of
nature (the Sierra Club) or guns (the NRA), with no need for
rational explanation. And assemblies often send profoundly
emotional messages of joy or rage, with little attempt at ratio-
nality. Antiwar rallies are not like debate club meetings. And
while Martin Luther King, Jr. was a profoundly thoughtful man,
nobody believes that the effectiveness of the civil rights protests
he led stemmed only or primarily from rational arguments as to
the justness of their cause. Indeed, sometimes, as arguably with
Occupy and Donald Trump rallies, the only message sent by an
assembly is one of rage, and demand for largely undefined
256. G. Wilson Gunn Jr., Letter to the Editor, Gundamentalism Is the Religion of the
United States, WASH. POST (May 19, 2019, 6:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/gundamentalism-is-the-religion-of-the-united-states/2019/05/19/c5ff56bc-7805-11e9-
a7bf-c8a43b84ee31_story.html [https://perma.cc/F6QA-KD7K]. But do not just take the word
of the gun-rights movement’s critics; this view is shared by its proponents. See Kristi Noem,
Noem: Protecting Our Way of Life, ARGUS LEADER (Feb. 1, 2019, 1:55 PM), https://www.argus
leader.com/story/news/dell-rapids/2019/02/01/noemprotecting-our-way-life/2745875002/
[https://perma.cc/UCH5-4M58] (“[T]he right to bear arms isn’t just an abstract right. It’s our
way of life.”).
257. Graham Ambrose, These Coloradans Say Earth Is Flat. And Gravity’s a Hoax. Now,
They’re Being Persecuted, DENV. POST (July 7, 2017, 3:44 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/
2017/07/07/colorado-earth-flat-gravity-hoax/ [https://perma.cc/GYC7-A4KD].
258. See Christine Smallwood, Astrology in the Age of Uncertainty, NEW YORKER (Oct. 21,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/10/28/astrology-in-the-age-of-uncertainty
[https://perma.cc/B8VF-992P].
259. See Jessica Bennett, When Did Everybody Become a Witch?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/books/peak-witch.html/ [https://perma.cc/XL7Q-
WGU5].
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change. This is not discourse or deliberation, but it is surely a
part of our democracy.260
Though writing about corporate speech, Professor Greenfield
confirms the value of group association and ties it to autonomy:
“[H]umans often exercise their autonomy and gain fulfillment by
organizing in groups. We join the National Rifle Association,
Planned Parenthood, and the Boy Scouts.... Groups are the mecha-
nism by which people exercise their autonomy.”261
Social cohesion is also built through common forms of communi-
cation. Belief, endorsement, or reposting of fake news serves a pow-
erful signaling function about one’s belief system or worldview. Such
signaling allows people with a common worldview to identify with
each other and reinforce their own beliefs, even if those beliefs are
centered around false facts. Signaling can be a powerful identifier
and it is unquestionably a form of expression that has value in
communicating one’s views and inviting others with those views to
join the same communities.262 As one historian described, “[W]here-
as the truth is universal, fictions tend to be local. Consequently if
we want to distinguish our tribe from foreigners, a fictional story
will serve as a far better identity marker than a true story.”263
Of course, this type of tribalism has costs as well as value. Critics
of fake news are justifiably concerned about insularity and filter
bubbles. Furthermore, such cohesion can bring together groups that
might facilitate more tangibly harmful conduct, such as idiosyn-
cratic religious cults or white supremacist groups. In the final Part,
this Article turns to some limits on its thesis and possible ways to
address the problems caused by fake news while remaining sen-
sitive to the potential value to its consumers.
260. Bhagwat, supra note 169, at 1118.
261. KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT)
120 (2018) (footnote omitted).
262. PINKER, supra note 52, at 359 (“While some of the conspiracy theorists may be
genuinely misinformed, most express these beliefs for the purpose of performance rather than
truth: they are trying to antagonize liberals and display solidarity with their blood brothers.”).
Viewed through this lens, spreading fake news might even be viewed as a form of
“performative utterance.” See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 6 (1962). 
263. Yuval Noah Harari, Opinion, Why Fiction Trumps Truth, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019),
https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/opinion/why-fiction-trumps-truth.html
[https://perma.cc/4GER-M3TX].
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IV. LIMITATIONS AND HOPES
None of this is to say that fake news is not a problem or that it is
not capable in many circumstances of causing serious harms.
Furthermore, even if the claim that fake news has some First
Amendment value to its willing consumers prevails, it also can be
argued that the corresponding harms to public discourse outweigh
such value. Thus, this Part concludes the Article with a discussion
of two points. First, it articulates important limitations on my the-
sis that fake news has some self-realization value, such that reg-
ulation may sometimes be both necessary and constitutionally valid
because the harms outweigh those values. Even then, thoughtful ap-
proaches to addressing such harms are critical. Accordingly, this
Part concludes by discussing some such approaches, short of im-
posing criminal penalties or civil damages on liars.
A. Limitations
To conclude that fake news has some First Amendment value,
and that we should consider such value in determining appropri-
ate responses to its apparent proliferation, is not to say that every
false statement about public affairs is constitutionally protected.
Recall that United States v. Alvarez held that government can reg-
ulate certain false statements of fact that cause legally cognizable
harm.264
Identifying what cognizable harms are sufficient to overcome the
speech interest, however, is not as simple as it seems. First, despite
pervasive discussions about fake news in the mainstream media and
on social media, there is a reasonable level of dispute about the
extent of the problem. Indeed, some evidence suggests that our fears
may be overstated. One study claims, for example, that the audience
for fake news is quite small in proportion to the audience for real
news—on the order of a one-to-ten ratio.265 Another study showed
264. 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (plurality opinion).
265. Jacob L. Nelson, Is ‘Fake News’ a Fake Problem?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 31,
2017), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/fake-news-facebook-audience-drudge-breitbart-study.php
[https://perma.cc/FY4X-R7H6].
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that social media, where fake news tended to spread more fre-
quently, has become an important source of political news, televi-
sion is still a substantially more important source.266 Consistent
with that, there is also data to suggest that the narrative about
media bubbles shaping public opinion is not accurate.267 It should
not be surprising, then, to find that scholars and policymakers
continue to focus on the phenomenon of fake news to gain a better
understanding of what we are facing as a democratic society.
For some of the same reasons that it is difficult to measure the
extent of fake news’s influence, it is hard to identify causal links
between its publication and broad social harms. Though some have
speculated that Russian disinformation campaigns affected the
outcome of the 2016 presidential election, particularly because the
vote margins in swing states were so close,268 it would be virtually
impossible to pin that on fake news given the wide range of
uncontrollable variables that might have simultaneously affected
voter behavior.269
On the other hand, there are circumstances in which the link
between fake news and resultant harm is much more direct. In such
cases, applying the principles from Alvarez, there should be much
less of a First Amendment concern regarding narrowly targeted
laws that focus on actual harms to individuals.270 As Justice Breyer
noted in his concurring opinion, the government may regulate lies
that cause “specific harm to identifiable victims.”271 This limiting
principle is consistent with Professor Sunstein’s suggestion,
discussed above, that false statements should be presumptively
protected “unless the government can show that allowing them will
266. Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election,
31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 211, 223 (2017).
267. See Maggie Koerth, Media Bubbles Aren’t the Biggest Reason We’re Partisans,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 8, 2019, 10:50 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/media-
bubbles-arent-the-biggest-reason-were-partisans/ [https://perma.cc/X22L-EK7Q].
268. Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, NEW YORKER (Sept.
24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia-helped-to-swing-the-
election-for-trump [https://perma.cc/39DN-3CXP].
269. See Silver, supra note 152.
270. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 734 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
271. Id.
2020] FREE SPEECH AND TRUTHS ABOUT LIES 419
cause serious harm that cannot be avoided through a more speech-
protective route.”272
For example, Professor Richard Hasen has recently suggested
that laws that regulate false election speech, which he defines as
“false speech about the mechanics of voting,” would not violate the
First Amendment.273 Thus, a news story that falsely reports that a
local election has been moved from Tuesday to Wednesday or
misidentifies the polling place for a particular precinct could be
regulated.274 I agree with Hasen’s assessment for three reasons.
First, this type of speech is more akin to outright fraud than other
forms of fake news, and the speech here is much more likely to be
linked to a material harm to individual voters. Second, as with
fraud, there is a limited and identifiable class of victims of this
type of speech. Third, false statements about election mechanics
seem less likely to have the kind of self-realization value or social
cohesion effect than fake news stories that advance other forms of
mistruths. Indeed, there might even be a claim that such actions are
more like conduct (for example, physically blocking a person from a
voting booth) than speech.
For similar reasons, Professor Rebecca Green’s recent proposal to
regulate “counterfeit campaign speech,” which she defines as “in-
stances in which political candidates’ identities, actions, words, and
images are intentionally faked with the intent to confuse voters and
distort democracy,” would not be problematic.275 Similar to the laws
Hasen proposes, Green’s proposal targets fraud-like activity and not
fake news more generally. Moreover, the type of speech targeted
by Hasen’s and Green’s proposals may not even fall within this
Article’s definition of fake news.
A critic of this approach might respond in two ways. First, the
systemic harms to democracy may not be provable. However, the
risk that democratic rule may be undermined (if, for example,
272. Sunstein, supra note 85, at 406 (emphasis omitted).
273. Hasen, supra note 90, at 14. Hasen also suggests that a law requiring social media
platforms to identify video or audio that has been altered using the best “reasonably
available” technology would pass constitutional muster, see id. at 15, but this proposal
addresses only deepfake videos, which I have previously bracketed for purposes of this Article,
see supra note 90.
274. See Hasen, supra note 90, at 14.
275. Green, supra note 90, at 1450.
420 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:357
people lose trust in the electoral system) provides sufficient jus-
tification to regulate fake news. Indeed, those harms may actually
be greater than those of an individual voter showing up to the wrong
polling place or on the wrong date. Again, however, the lack of
evidence of direct harm is problematic in any First Amendment
analysis.276 Second, there will be cases in which it is difficult to
distinguish between general and specific harm. Take, for example,
the Comet Ping Pong pizza incident.277 Under the model proposed
in this Article, the government could arguably prove a sufficiently
direct link between the story and the harmful conduct such that
regulation would be appropriate. The concern here, however, would
be that any number of stories, or even parodies, could cause an
unreasonable individual or person with mental illness to act in
harmful ways, which might lead to overbroad regulations. Of course,
even if fake news is sometimes constitutionally protected, the
tangible harms it causes can still be criminalized.278
Perhaps another limitation arises when fake news’s appeal to the
emotional rather than the rational is directly linked to a cognizable
or material harm. Some examples of this already exist in the cur-
rent doctrine. The subversive advocacy cases, for example, hold that
statements that potentially incite unlawful conduct are protected
unless the government can show that they were “directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and [are] likely to incite or
produce such action.”279 In one view, the idea that such speakers can
be punished is premised on the notion that the inciting speech
provokes such a visceral emotional response as to overcome or re-
duce the audience’s capacity for deliberation.280 Here, however, we
276. To be sure, in the no-value speech cases, the Court has presumed the harms because
they are self-evident, at least to the Court. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942); see also Chen & Marceau, supra note 12, at 664. In other areas, and even under
intermediate scrutiny, the Court imposes on the government a burden of justification for its
speech regulations. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 495 (2014).
277. See supra text accompanying note 153.
278. Matthew Haag & Maya Salam, Gunman in ‘Pizzagate’ Shooting Is Sentenced to 4
Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/us/pizza
gate-attack-sentence.html [https://perma.cc/X4PH-A57L].
279. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
280. See Lidsky, supra note 161, at 815; see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Brandenburg and
the United States’ War on Incitement Abroad: Defending a Double Standard, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1009, 1021 (2002).
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must be careful because so much speech that is valuable, including
fake news, can also stimulate an emotional and impassioned re-
sponse. As the Court stated in Terminiello v. Chicago, free speech
“may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger.”281
Analysis of future regulations would probably have to be done
under a case-by-case balancing approach rather than a categorical
balancing approach to ensure that speech is not impeded except
when there is tangible evidence that it causes a cognizable harm.
That could lead to some uncertainty, which is less than optimal, but
it is probably a preferable approach to a categorical rule here.
B. Noncensorship Proposals
To the extent that fake news does cause potentially broad social
harms, but direct censorship regulations are problematic under free
speech law, policymakers could consider noncensorship alternatives
to addressing such harms. This already occurs at the international
and domestic levels. But there are numerous challenges here as
well.
1. Counterspeech
First, we might consider turning to what has by now evolved into
a cliché of First Amendment doctrine—that the solution to prob-
lematic or potentially harmful speech is not regulation, but the
promotion of more speech. A standard response to arguments to
censor or otherwise regulate harmful speech is that society is bet-
ter served by a system that promotes speech that directly counters
such harmful expression. In this way, so the argument goes, the
speech is addressed not by government power but by being subject
to open criticism and rebuttal in ways that command the public’s
281. 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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attention.282 In other words, the harmful speech is defeated in the
battle for truth.
At first glance, promotion of counterspeech seems like a particu-
larly helpful way to address the fake news problem for a number of
reasons. If the lies are objectively verifiable as false, the presenta-
tion of alternative factual scenarios seems like a more direct kind of
counterspeech than simply rebutting an idea or philosophy.
That does not mean that presentation of counterspeech will
necessarily be persuasive. For the reasons described above, some
audiences may want to be lied to because lies better fit their in-
ternal views and values than objective factual truth. But for those
open to such convincing and who want to engage in rational
deliberation, factual responses may be important. Indeed, it is
possible that one positive externality of the proliferation of fake
news is an increasing awareness among the general public that this
phenomenon exists, which ideally would breed greater skepticism
throughout society. A Pew Research Center poll shortly after the
2016 presidential election indicated that 64 percent of Americans
polled believed that fake news caused “a great deal of confusion”
about the basic facts of current events, and another 24 percent
believed it caused “some confusion.”283 “[I]f one knows fake news
exists, then it should make one a more thoughtful, active, and
inquisitive news consumer. People who understand fake news as a
reality should rightfully be more skeptical about the veracity of
what they read rather than accepting it blindly or at face value.”284
Thus, heightened awareness of the potential invalidity of news
stories published through social media may be an essential compo-
nent of a response to fake news. Though certainly not controlling,
public opinion polls also reflect that a majority of Americans would
282. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) (“[I]t is our law and our
tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”), overruled by Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
283. Michael Barthel, Amy Mitchell & Jesse Norman, Many Americans Believe Fake News
Is Sowing Confusion, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/
many-americans-believe-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion/ [https://perma.cc/6GD7-6WCK].
284. Calvert & Vining, supra note 22, at 170.
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prefer freedom of access to online information to government reg-
ulation, even if it means some false information is published.285
How might we promote more counterspeech? In some ways,
responses have already emerged as independent, nonprofit organi-
zations such as Snopes286 and PolitiFact287 have become valuable
market participants. Mainstream media outlets, too, have begun to
print and broadcast explicit fact-checking features.288
For what should be obvious reasons, it would probably not be a
very good idea to have government agencies in charge of fact check-
ing, particularly in the context of lies expressed in campaigns. It
seems highly counterintuitive to think about government truth-
sayers vetting fake news stories at this point in history. But that
should not stop policymakers from thinking creatively about ways
to promote the mainstream media and subsidize fact checking in the
private or nonprofit sectors. The Australian government, for ex-
ample, has announced that it will begin negotiations to require
Facebook and Google to pay news organizations for stories that are
reproduced through their sites.289 Another recent, though controver-
sial, proposal is the idea of establishing government funding to
promote local news outlets.290
Skeptics, however, argue that in this context “more speech” is a
woefully inadequate solution to the dissemination of fake news.
First, there may be a primacy or stickiness effect such that once
people hear fake news, they absorb it in ways that are stabilized
285. Amy Mitchell, Elizabeth Grieco & Nami Sumida, Americans Favor Protecting
Information Freedoms over Government Steps to Restrict False News Online, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.journalism.org/2018/04/19/americans-favor-protecting-informa
tion-freedoms-over-government-steps-to-restrict-false-news-online/ [https://perma.cc/42WH-
4Q85].
286. Fact Check, SNOPES, https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/ [https://perma.cc/5DA5-
Y89W].
287. POLITIFACT, https://www.politifact.com/ [https://perma.cc/A84P-PVT8].
288. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, Fact Checker: The Truth Behind the Rhetoric, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/?utm_term=.7c7c3a24c87e [https://perma.
cc/9R8R-PZ6A]; Fact Checks, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/fact-checks
[https://perma.cc/EXZ2-6HX6].
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TIMES (May 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/business/media/big-tech-has-
crushed-the-news-business-thats-about-to-change.html [https://perma.cc/H6MP-5VCR].
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before timely counterspeech can be disseminated.291 Perhaps even
more troublesome, several studies have suggested that corrections
to objectively false facts have the opposite of the intended effect, and
rather than dissuade listeners instead re-entrench their belief in the
false news.292
Even when myths are dispelled, their effects linger. The Boston
College political scientist Emily Thorson conducted a series of
studies showing that exposure to a news article containing a
damaging allegation about a fictional political candidate caused
people to rate the candidate more negatively even when the
allegation was corrected and people believed it to be false.293
Indeed, one of the factors that researchers have identified as most
important to the effectiveness of fact-checking is that fact checks
“don’t directly challenge one’s worldview and identity.”294
These concerns underscore the importance of recognizing how
listeners value fake news because of its self-realization and social
cohesion functions. It is precisely the emotional value of the speech
that may make it more difficult to persuade some audiences that it
is objectively false. These limitations are critical for policymakers
to understand, but that does not mean they should give up on ways
to promote counterspeech. We should continue to study ways to
correct misinformation more effectively. “Adam Berinsky of M.I.T.,
for instance, found that a surprising co-partisan source (a Republi-
can member of Congress) was the most effective in reducing belief
in the ‘death panel’ myth about the Affordable Care Act.”295 With a
clear eye focused on these limitations, however, creative ideas to
promote counterspeech to fake news should be a part of the menu of
solutions.
291. Emily A. Thorson & Stephan Stohler, Maladies in the Misinformation Marketplace,
16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 442, 443 (2017). These have been described as “belief echoes: at-
titudinal shifts that persist even after individuals abandon their commitment to incorrect
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2. Technological and Platform-Based Solutions
To some extent the market is already responding to the fake news
problem, as social media platforms have finally begun to think
about ways to address fake news dissemination. These efforts fall
into a few general categories.
First, there are notice or labeling requirements to make consum-
ers aware of the source of the stories that they are reading.
Facebook, for example, announced plans to require advertisers to
verify their identities and locations before running political ads and
will soon require the identities and locations of people who run large
Facebook groups.296 Several platforms have indicated interest in
adding “trust indicators” to posted stories. These would be symbols
that would appear by the stories indicating how they were reported,
by whom, and noting the credentials of the reporter.297 Some have
proposed the development of a uniform private accreditation system
to establish industry standards for identifying reliable sources of
news and other information.298 Educational efforts by social media
companies are another way they can address the consumption of
fake news. For example, Facebook paid for ads in major Mexican
newspapers in advance of a national election to provide citizens with
tips about how to identify fake news stories.299
Second, some social media platforms have engaged independent
fact-checking organizations to help them identify fake news.
Facebook has been doing this since 2016 and has brought in
organizations from a range of political ideologies to help.300 Though
296. Jack Nicas, Facebook to Require Verified Identities for Future Political Ads, N.Y.TIMES
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this system does not stop people from posting fake news, the system
warns them that they may be sharing false information before they
repost it.301 In 2017, Google announced that it would employ a range
of mechanisms to combat the spread of false information, including
working with the International Fact-Checking Network run by the
Poynter Institute.302 Google has also partnered with the Trust
Project, a consortium of news companies dedicated to developing
transparency standards.303
Third, there is a proliferation of technology companies, including
many new start-ups, trying to develop artificial intelligence
mechanisms to address fake news.304 A nonprofit organization called
Fake News Challenge, which describes itself as “a grassroots effort
of over 100 volunteers and 71 teams from academia and industry
around the world,” has even established a competition to promote
the development of artificial intelligence mechanisms for detecting
fake news.305
Not surprisingly, there are limits to these approaches as well.
First, the development of technological solutions does not forestall
those who wish to promote the spread of fake news from developing
workarounds, resulting in something of a fake news arms race.
Furthermore, social media platforms themselves appear to be
worried about being viewed as biased. “Effectiveness of these efforts
is limited since they inevitably provoke accusations of censorship
and partisanship. Changes to algorithms have often been met with
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Of course, these are market solutions rather than government
ones. Some have suggested limited intervention by the state to
tweak the existing social media framework. One such proposal is
that governments should require social media platforms to use an
“open application programming interface,” which would allow third
parties to develop software to monitor and report on the impact of
social media algorithms.307 This would not require the platforms to
reveal their proprietary algorithms but would mandate that they
share the results of those algorithms. Government solutions carry
their own baggage, however, as social media platforms might enjoy
their own First Amendment rights.308
3. Structural Changes to the Information Environment
Finally, perhaps one of the principal problems with the prolifera-
tion of fake news is the demise of professional journalism, especially
the traditional print media. The best antidote to fake news might be
a robust, objective, well-resourced professional press, but market
forces are diminishing the number of independent media sources
and are likely to continue to do so.309 Even if professional journalism
makes a comeback, the economics of the industry make it unlikely
it will return to its former standard of credibility. Similar to other
institutions, the press has lost much credibility among the general
public in recent years.310
Numerous proposals have been made to increase public aware-
ness of fake news and to improve the levels of civic education and
critical analytical thinking, particularly in younger people. Califor-
nia and other states have adopted laws requiring their education
departments to provide media literacy sources to teachers and
students.311 Instilling such skills early in the educational process
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may have a multiplier effect given already existing generational
differences in the consumption of fake news. One study by research-
ers at New York University and Princeton showed that people over
the age of sixty-five are much more likely to spread fake news
through social media.312 But others propose a more widely reaching
educational effort aimed at the university level and beyond.313 In
addition, organizations including National Public Radio and the
RAND Corporation are increasingly providing tools to educate
consumers about how to identify fake news stories.314
These efforts seem sensible, but they too must be undertaken
with an understanding about the emotional impact and power of
fake news stories. If, as we have already seen, people come to stand
by their beliefs because of their prior partisan or otherwise ideologi-
cal commitments, the effectiveness of educational measures to
promote critical thinking might be severely limited. Some research-
ers dispute the emotional claim and argue that belief in fake news
has more to do with laziness than with an individual’s partisan
affiliation.315 If that is the cause of fake news proliferation, then it
stands to reason that promotion of critical thinking might help.316
However, if the researchers who conclude that emotional con-
nection to belief is more powerful than objective fact are correct,
education may not be the solution.317 Moreover, the research of the
latter group not only suggests that education will have no signi-
ficant impact on the proliferation of fake news, but also that it
might even be counterproductive. Recall that some of this research
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indicates that counterspeech may only harden the views of fake
news consumers.318 What is even more alarming is the notion that
people with stronger reasoning skills may be even less susceptible
to fake news corrections because those skills allow them to ratio-
nalize their continuing belief in the fake news story in the face of
an objectively true rebuttal.319
The broader point here is that in designing reform measures,
policymakers should consider the emotional power of fake news and
the social cohesion function that it plays for many people in our
society.
CONCLUSION
It seems particularly ironic in an era when researchers in many
areas, including medicine, education, criminal justice, and public
policy, have been making a strong push toward “evidence-based”
decision-making that there should at the same time be a widespread
epidemic of fake news. Fake news is an ongoing problem in our
democracy, even if the actual degree of harm it causes remains in
dispute. Recognizing the epistemic harms of fake news without
acknowledging that it may also have free speech value to its
consumers severely limits our ability to learn when and how it
should be appropriately addressed.
Understood in the framework of the self-realization theories of
free speech, fake news can have important value to its willing
consumers. It can both promote expressive experiential autonomy
and serve as a vehicle for fake news readers to connect with other
people who share their worldview. These emotional and group
bonding values also make it easier to comprehend the seductive
allure of fake news. Believers are ushered into a community in
which they can find a degree of comfort and support. Understanding
these emotional and social cohesion functions is not only a way of
318. See PINKER, supra note 52, at 359, 377. But see Pennycook & Rand, supra note 315
(“Recent studies have shown, for instance, that correcting partisan misperceptions does not
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measuring fake news’s First Amendment value but also compre-
hending the ways to address its antidemocratic effects.
This Article seeks to develop a model for understanding fake news
that not only promotes a more nuanced view of why government
efforts to contain it might actually exacerbate harms by deepening
the emotional entrenchment of fake news consumers, but also
allows policymakers to design solutions that may actually address
any potential harms in a narrow and focused manner. Thus, it
reaches beyond more conventional analyses focusing on why state
regulation of fake news might violate the First Amendment to argue
that, in the absence of concrete and imminent tangible harms that
can be directly tied to specific fake news stories, the First Amend-
ment ought to protect fake news dissemination because it is a form
of expression that has value to its consumers. Senator Moynihan,
as it turns out, may have been wrong.320
320. Supra text accompanying note 1.
